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“It’s my job to figure out what a physician’s price is . . . at the most basic 
level, everything is for sale and everything is an exchange.”1 
ABSTRACT 
Pharmaceutical side effects cause more than 100,000 deaths per year.2 Because 
pharmaceuticals pose serious risks, the Food and Drug Administration carefully vets the 
written warnings that physicians receive about each drug. But alongside these official 
warnings, attractive pharmaceutical representatives offer slick sales pitches in what 
amounts to a multi-billion-dollar campaign aimed at influencing the physician’s judgment. 
Pharmaceutical representatives are known to downplay the package insert’s warn-
ings. Based on social science research, the marketing operates at a subconscious level, so 
                                                          
 1.  Shahram Ahari & Adriane Fugh-Berman, Following the Script: How Drug Reps Make Friends & Influ-
ence Doctors, PLOS MED (Apr. 24, 2007), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1876413/. Mr. Ahari 
is a former pharmaceutical representative for Eli Lilly.   
 2. Preventable Adverse Drug Reactions, FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/drugs/de-
velopmentapprovalprocess/developmentresources/druginteractionslabeling/ucm110632.htm#ADRs: Prevalence 
and Incidence (last visited Aug. 6, 2013). 
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targeted physicians are often unaware of its surreptitious effects. Nonetheless, pharma-
ceutical company defendants in failure-to-warn lawsuits can often obtain summary judg-
ment based purely on the package insert, while the pervasive—and effective—warning-
diluting marketing information is ignored. 
This article proposes that the failure-to-warn inquiry face up to pharmaceutical 
marketing’s potent role in many prescribing decisions. Courts assessing a warning’s ad-
equacy cannot stop at the package insert but must consider the warning-diluting marketing 
information as well. And when causation is the question, the physician’s testimony should 
not be conclusive as to the marketing information’s effects. Failure-to-warn jurisprudence 
should stop relying on empty paper compliance and recognize present-day pharmaceutical 
marketing as a compelling and driving force in the decision to prescribe. 
INTRODUCTION 
Pharmaceuticals cure disease and prolong life. Their side effects, however, cause 
more than 100,000 deaths per year.3 Pharmaceuticals are aptly recognized as “inherently 
dangerous” products that require special care in their use. Given these risks—and patients’ 
reliance on physicians’ judgment in prescribing pharmaceuticals—the warnings and mar-
keting materials reaching physicians should be carefully regulated. In some respects, they 
are. The package insert accompanying each pharmaceutical is carefully vetted by the fed-
eral Food and Drug Administration. In a failure-to-warn lawsuit, this insert is decisive; a 
pharmaceutical company defendant can most often brandish the package insert and cut off 
liability via summary judgment. 
But another, perhaps more influential, source of information reliably reaches physi-
cians. Pharmaceutical representatives’ slick sales pitches to physicians amount to a billion-
dollar campaign that can eclipse the lengthy written package insert whose minute text 
tends to remain unread. Unlike the colorless package insert, pharmaceutical representa-
tives offer an alluring message often delivered by attractive individuals culled from the 
ranks of college cheerleading squads.4 Pharmaceutical representatives make about 115 
million physician sales calls per year.5 Documents obtained in litigation and first-hand ac-
counts show pharmaceutical representatives downplaying the very warnings described in 
the package insert. Nonetheless, pharmaceutical companies in failure-to-warn lawsuits are 
                                                          
 3. Id.  
 4. Reuters, U.S. Files 2nd Suit Accusing Novartis of Kickbacks to Doctors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2013, at 
B8. According to the lawsuit, Novartis paid rich speaking fees to physicians for over a decade and provided 
lavish meals including one at the restaurant Nobu that cost over $10,000, all as an inducement to prescribe No-
vartis’s drugs. The government also alleges that the incentive program led to the Medicare and Medicaid pro-
grams’ paying “millions of dollars in reimbursements based on kickback-tainted claims for medication like the 
hypertension drugs Lotrel and Valturna and the diabetes drug Starlix,” Id.  Pharmaceutical companies frequently 
recruit directly from college cheerleading squads, monitoring which cheerleaders are graduating and targeting 
specific cheerleading programs. Stephanie Saul, Gimme an Rx! Cheerleaders Pep Up Drug Sales, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 28, 2005, at A1 (“Anyone who has seen the parade of sales representatives through a doctor’s waiting room 
has probably noticed that they are frequently female and invariably good looking. Less recognized is the fact that 
a good many are recruited from the cheerleading ranks.”). Pharmaceutical company managers respond that cheer-
leaders are hired for personality rather than looks, Id. (“‘Obviously, people hired for the work have to be extro-
verts, a good conversationalist, a pleasant person to talk to; but that has nothing to do with looks, it’s the person-
ality,’ said Lamberto Andreotti, the president of worldwide pharmaceuticals for Bristol-Myers Squibb.”). 
 5. Jonathan D. Rockoff, Drug Sales Reps Try a Softer Pitch Physicians – In Changed Times, Physicians 
Increasingly Set Agenda, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2012, at B1.  
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usually able to obtain summary judgment based purely on a package insert, while the over-
whelming and effective warning-diluting marketing information is ignored. 
This article proposes that the failure-to-warn inquiry recognize pharmaceutical mar-
keting’s central role in many prescribing decisions. Pharmaceutical marketing downplays 
warnings, making the package insert less effective. This means that when courts decide 
the adequacy of a warning, as the initial step in a failure-to-warn claim, a realistic assess-
ment of the “warning” should include not only the package insert, but also the marketing 
information that reaches physicians far more reliably than the package insert. In addition, 
pharmaceutical marketing affects the second step in the failure-to-warn analysis, namely 
whether an inadequate warning actually caused the plaintiff’s injury. At present, pharma-
ceutical companies commonly escape liability on summary judgment, when physicians 
testify that pharmaceutical companies’ statements did not affect them, and a better warning 
would have made no difference. But pharmaceutical marketing, based on painstaking so-
cial science research, operates at a subconscious level—the physician-target is the person 
least able to testify to its effects. Both the warning adequacy and causation issues, there-
fore, should be left for the jury’s consideration. Pharmaceutical companies should be fully 
accountable for their marketing to physicians. Particularly because pharmaceutical com-
panies are legally required to warn only physicians and not patients, the total mix of infor-
mation that physicians receive must be considered in any failure-to-warn case, and a jury 
should decide causation. 
Part I of the article shows how pharmaceutical companies’ marketing techniques 
surreptitiously affect physicians’ prescribing habits. Part II explains why the existing web 
of pharmaceutical regulations and policies is ineffective in curbing pharmaceutical sales 
practices. Part III shows the primacy of the package insert in failure-to-warn cases, to-
gether with some courts’ consistent but frustrated desire to take pharmaceutical represent-
atives’ statements into account in failure-to-warn cases. Part IV explains that these realities 
of pharmaceutical marketing require that the failure-to-warn inquiry adapt in the following 
ways: (1) the warning at issue should include not just the package insert, but also market-
ing information; (2) a physician’s failure to read the package insert should not alone be 
sufficient to defeat causation; and (3) a physician’s own statement as to a lack of reliance 
on the pharmaceutical company’s information should not defeat causation. 
 
I. PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETING: AN EXPENSIVE ENDEAVOR THAT RELIABLY 
AFFECTS PRESCRIBING DECISIONS 
Pharmaceutical marketing is a multi-billion-dollar industry that has a well-docu-
mented influence on physicians’ prescribing choices and habits. Pharmaceutical marketing 
expenditures in the United States exceeded $27 billion in 2012.6 Some estimate that phar-
maceutical companies spend about two times as much money on marketing than they do 
on research and development; approximately 24.4 percent of each revenue dollar is spent 
on marketing, as opposed to 13.4 percent on research and development.7    
                                                          
 6. 2012 U.S. Pharmaceutical Promotion Spending, CEGEDIM STRATEGIC DATA, (Jan. 2013), 
http://www.skainfo.com/health_care_market_reports/2012_promotional_spending.pdf. 
 7. Donald W. Light & Joel R. Lexchin, Pharmaceutical Research & Development: What Do We Get for All 
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The pharmaceutical industry considers detailing—physician-directed marketing—
to be the most effective form of pharmaceutical marketing.8 Pharmaceutical sales repre-
sentatives pay about 115 million visits to 340,000 doctors each year.9 
A.  Pharmaceutical Companies use Social Psychology to Create a Relationship that 
Influences Physicians at the Subconscious Level 
The most crucial aspect of pharmaceutical representatives’ marketing to physicians 
is the representative-physician relationship.10 This relationship is based first on careful re-
search on the particular physician’s prescribing habits and patient behaviors. Pharmaceu-
tical companies pay to find out which drugs a physician is prescribing and whether the 
patients are having prescriptions filled.11 This information is readily available and tracka-
ble,12 together with information on patients’ medical conditions, lab results, and some-
times, demographic information.13 One research firm has tracked information on doctors’ 
prescribing habits since the 1990s—the available information now includes insurance 
claims data as well.14 By tracking patient behavior data, together with prescribing infor-
mation, research companies aim to give pharmaceutical representatives “the ability to un-
derstand not only the doctor’s behavior, and which other physicians are key opinion lead-
ers that the doctor listens to, but also the behavior of the doctor’s patients.”15 
The pharmaceutical industry closely monitors all contacts with physicians.16 One 
                                                          
That Money, THE BMJ, http://www.bmj.com/content/345/bmj.e4348 (last visited Aug. 7, 2013). 
 8. Kanika Johar, An Insider’s Perspective: Defense of the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Marketing Practices, 
76 ALB. L. REV. 299, 309 (2013) (citing SHAILI JAIN, UNDERSTANDING PHYSICIAN-PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY INTERACTIONS 59 n.1 (2007)). 
 9. Rockoff, supra note 5. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Katie Thomas, Data Trove on Doctors Guides Drug Company Pitches, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2013, at B1 
(“I think the doctors tend not to be aware of the depths to which they are being analyzed and studied by the 
people trying to sell them drugs and other medical products . . . . Almost by definition, a lot of this stuff happens 
under the radar—there may be a sales pitch, but the doctor may not know that sales pitch is being informed by 
their own prescribing patterns.”) (quoting Dr. Jerry Avorn, professor of medicine at Harvard Medical School and 
developer of programs to resist pharmaceutical marketing). 
 12. Pharmacies receive prescriber-identifying information on a routine basis when filling prescriptions, Sor-
rell v. IMS Health, Inc., U.S., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011). Many pharmacies sell this information to “data 
miners,” companies that analyze and report on this information; pharmaceutical companies in turn pay for access 
to these reports, so their marketing efforts can be more closely tailored to a particular prescriber’s habits and 
preferences. Id. at 2660. The United States Supreme Court recently struck down a Vermont law making such 
sales of prescriber practice information illegal, on the basis that the law was an unconstitutional burden on pro-
tected speech. Id. at 2659. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Thomas, supra note 11 (quoting Jerry Maynor, the director of marketing for North America at Cegedim 
Strategic Data). 
 16. The Doctor Won’t See You (Mr. Pharma Rep), Now; Number of ‘rep-accessible’ docs falls another 20 
percent; ‘rep-inaccessible’ docs increase 50 percent, PR NEWSWIRE, May 6, 2012. Pharmaceutical companies 
can subscribe, for example, to services such as AccessMonitor, described as “a proprietary tool that incorporates 
the call reports from more than 200 different U.S. pharmaceutical sales teams representing more than 175 differ-
ent products. The report equips companies with data to make the best use of sales and marketing resources in a 
systematic way and includes sales operations, field management and marketing strategies. Id. This could involve 
making meaningful changes to sales force structure and deployment, improving territory and compensation plan 
design, and analyzing marketing effectiveness and use of alternative media. The data supplied by the Access-
Monitor™ report enables each pharmaceutical company to determine its own response to the current environment 
“based on its unique needs.” Id. Pharmaceutical companies use information on which prescribers are already 
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service counts the number of visits by pharmaceutical representatives and ranks physicians 
based on their willingness to see pharmaceutical representatives: completely open, some-
times willing to see pharmaceutical representatives, or completely unwilling.17 
1. Pharmaceutical Marketing is Grounded in Social Science Research. 
Based on the data they study, pharmaceutical representatives forge a relationship 
that goes on to influence physicians at the subconscious level. Pharmaceutical representa-
tives are trained in human behavior, and they studiously build and attend to their relation-
ships with physicians. For example, representatives study physicians’ offices to see if there 
is any kind of trinket or photograph that can serve as the springboard to a personal con-
nection.18 They share meals to promote bonding and sharing behaviors, in which the rep-
resentative behaves as a friend to the physician.19 Pharmaceutical representatives also give 
gifts and arrange for payments, such as honoraria for speaking.20 According to some stud-
ies, physicians have a “mostly negative” attitude toward the practice of pharmaceutical 
representatives providing gifts; however, the studies also report that such gifts “induce 
reciprocal feelings among physicians.”21 
Physicians themselves report that contacts with pharmaceutical representatives have 
little or no effect on their prescribing habits, although some believe that their colleagues’ 
judgment may be affected.22 When physicians say that pharmaceutical marketing plays 
only a minor role in their prescribing decisions, pharmaceutical companies tout this self-
reporting as “evidence” that pharmaceutical marketing does no harm.23 Significantly, how-
ever, physicians who meet with the greatest number of pharmaceutical representatives are 
the least likely to believe that their judgment would be affected.24 
It is unsurprising, however, that physicians would report that they are not influenced 
or influenced by marketing, because pharmaceutical marketing uses principles of social 
                                                          
using a drug, which turn to a competing drug, and how long a patient stays on a particular drug. David Orentili-
cher, The Effects of Health Information Technology on the Physician-Patient Relationship, 38 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 74, 75 (2010). While patient names are not disclosed, each patient is given a number, so that pharmaceu-
tical companies can analyze the prescriptions for each patient as a whole. Id. 
 17. Orentilicher, supra note 16, at 75. 
 18. Ahari & Fugh-Berman, supra note 1 (“Reps scour a doctor’s office for objects—a tennis racquet, Russian 
novels, seventies rock music, fashion magazines, travel mementos, or cultural or religious symbols—that can be 
used to establish a personal connection with the doctor.”).  
 19. Id. (“During training, I was told, when you’re out to dinner with a doctor, ‘The physician is eating with a 
friend. You are eating with a client.’”). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Puneet Manchanda & Elisabeth Honka, The Effects and Role of Direct-to-Physician Marketing in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry: An Integrative Review, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 785, 809 (2005); see 
also Jason Dana & George Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on Gifts to Physicians from Industry, 290 
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 252, 252-54 (2003). 
 22. M.A. Morgan et al., Interactions of Doctors with the Pharmaceutical Industry, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 559-
63 (2006). 
 23. Pharmaceutical Marketing in Perspective: Its Value and Role as One of Many Factors Informing Pre-
scrib-
ing, PHRMA, available at http://phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/phrma_marketing_brochure_influences_on_p
rescribing_final.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2013) (noting that only 14 percent of physicians report that pharmaceu-
tical representatives have a “major” impact on prescribing decisions and that only eleven percent of physicians 
surveyed said that they consider information from pharmaceutical representatives a “great deal” as a factor in 
prescribing). 
 24. Brian Hodges MD, FRCPC, Interactions with the Pharmaceutical Industry: Experiences and Attitudes of 
Psychiatry Residents, Interns, and Clerks, 153 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 553, 557 (1995).   
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psychology, which operate at a sub-conscious level.25 Above all, pharmaceutical repre-
sentative training emphasizes the importance of relationships: “[G]aining access and 
building relationships . . . are key to providing you the opportunity to influence your cus-
tomers’ behaviors.”26 Once the representatives have established a relationship, they can 
exert various and, subtle forms of social pressure to extract the result they seek. These 
pressures—based on well-known principles of social psychology—include “reciprocation, 
commitment, social proof, liking, authority, and scarcity.”27 Representatives learn how to 
recognize physician receptiveness, and representatives study each of the potential road-
blocks to physicians’ accepting the representative’s message and the means of overcoming 
each obstacle.28 
Empirical evidence indicates that despite physicians’ beliefs to the contrary, phar-
maceutical marketing is effective in influencing physicians’ actions, whether those actions 
result in requesting additions to a formulary, initiating use of a certain drug, or choosing 
to prescribe one drug over another.29 Marketing changes physicians’ behavior, therefore, 
                                                          
 25. Sunita Sah & Adriane Fugh-Berman, Physicians Under the Influence: Social Psychology & Industry 
Marketing Strategies, 41 J. LAW. MED. & ETHICS 665 (2013) (noting that “[p]hysicians fail to recognize their 
vulnerability to commercial influences due to self-serving bias . . . even the most conscious and genuine com-
mitment to ethical behavior cannot eliminate unintentional, subconscious bias”).  
 26. Memorandum from Rep. Henry A. Waxman, to the Democratic Members of the Government Reform 
Committee (May 5, 2005), available at http://oversight-archive.waxman.house.gov/docu-
ments/20050505114932-41272.pdf. 
 27. Sah & Fugh-Berman, supra note 25, at 665. Reciprocation is the principle that help or gifts should be 
reciprocal—pharmaceutical representatives therefore give gifts so as to prompt physicians to respond in kind. Id. 
at 667-68. Even small gifts result in feelings of reciprocity. Id. Commitment is the sense that one should abide 
by one’s promises. Id. Pharmaceutical representatives illicit feelings of commitment by overtly asking physicians 
to commit to selecting the marketed drug for the physician’s next few prescriptions. Social proof is the idea that 
one decides what to do by observing what others do; promotional items for a particular drug can increase physi-
cians’ positive views of a particular drug. Liking or rapport increases with more frequent interactions and length 
of time of the relationship. Id at 669 (noting that Jordan Katz, a former pharmaceutical sales representative, 
reported that “a lot of doctors just write [prescriptions] for who they like.”). Authority and scarcity involves 
pharmaceutical companies’ payments to “Key Opinion Leaders” to champion a particular drug. Id. Perhaps most 
significantly, these forms of influence operate largely on the subconscious, resulting in influence without physi-
cians’ self-reporting or even realizing that they are so influenced. Id. at 665. 
 28. Sah & Fugh-Berman, supra note 25, at 665. Another important technique emphasized in Merck’s internal 
document entitled “Champion Selling” was to assess the personality of doctors in order to determine what type 
of information would be most convincing to them. For a doctor with a “technical” personality, sales representa-
tives were taught to “use figures, percentages” in their pitches; for a doctor with a “supportive personality,” 
representatives were advised to “focus on benefits to patients”; and for a doctor with an “expressive personality,” 
representatives were told to “show enthusiasm; appeal to his/her ego.” Merck, Champion Selling: Milestone 
Leader’s Guide (Jan. 2002) (cited in Memorandum from Rep. Henry A. Waxman, supra note 26). 
 29. Mary-Margaret Chren & Seth Landefled, Physicans’ Behavior and Their Interactions with Drug Compa-
nies. A Controlled Study of Physicians who Requested Additions to a Hospital Drug Formulary, 271 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 684, 684-88 (1994). In addition, numerous studies have asked physicians to report changes in their own 
behavior in response to pharmaceutical representatives’ contacts or gifts. In one study, almost a third of medical 
residents reported changing their own behavior in response to interactions with pharmaceutical representatives. 
Nicole Lurie, MD, MSPH, et al., Pharmaceutical Representatives in Academic Medical Centers; Interaction with 
Faculty and Housestaff, 5 J. GEN. INTERN. MED. 240 (1990). Another study examined objective information to 
determine the effect of pharmaceutical representatives’ contacts with medical residents. Mary-Margaret Chren 
& Seth Landefled, Physicans’ Behavior and Their Interactions with Drug Companies.  A Controlled Study of 
Physicians who Requested Additions to a Hospital Drug Formulary, 271 JAMA 684, 684-88 (Mar. 2, 1994). 
That study found that residents were more likely to initiate use of the company’s product within twelve weeks 
after contact with a representative. Id. See also Roger W. Spingarn, MD, Jesse A. Berlin, ScD, & Briam L. Strom, 
MD, MPH, When Pharmaceutical Manufacturers’ Employees Present Grand Rounds, What Do Residents Re-
member? 71 ACAD MED. 86 (1996) (finding that residents who attended a Grand Rounds presentation on the 
Lyme disease drug were more likely to recommend it as a first-line drug when it was indicated, and even when 
it was not).  
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despite the fact that modern medicine aims for prescribing decisions to be scientific and 
evidence-based.30 Marketing, other than the distribution of even-handed studies, arguably 
stands in the way of unbiased medical decision-making.31 Studies conclude that visits with 
pharmaceutical representatives have “a significant effect on physician prescription behav-
ior.”32 
Pharmaceutical companies’ spending on marketing is highly effective, although few 
studies to establish this have been funded.33 Physicians exposed to pharmaceutical prod-
ucts through the provision of free samples, for example, are more likely to prescribe those 
medications and are less likely to use inexpensive alternatives.34 Pharmaceutical compa-
nies refer to these samples as “starters,” because the purpose of them is to start the patient 
on a particular medication.35 In addition, physicians who attend promotional events are 
documented as increasing their prescribing of the promoted medication.36 One meta-anal-
ysis indicated that of twenty-nine studies of pharmaceutical representative visits, seven-
teen found an association with an increase in the prescribing of the marketed drug.37 None 
of the studies found an absence of association between visits and increased prescribing.38 
Longer pharmaceutical representative visits were more likely to be associated with in-
creased prescribing.39 In addition, pharmaceutical representative visits mean more money 
spent on medicines: of eight studies, seven found that prescription costs increased with 
greater contact from pharmaceutical representatives.40 
Where a drug shows no documented benefit over another, high levels of marketing 
can result in sales far exceeding the equivalent generic. For example, the blood pressure 
drug Bystolic, manufactured by Forest Laboratories, is a brand-name drug costing about 
eighty dollars per month, versus ten dollars per month for generic equivalents.41 Upon By-
stolic’s launch, Forest received a warning letter from the FDA stating that Forest had 
downplayed the serious risks of side effects, and had made unsubstantiated claims of su-
periority; indeed, the FDA stated that despite Bystolic’s claims of novelty and superiority, 
                                                          
 30. BEN GOLDACRE, BAD PHARMA 246 (2013).  
The scale of this spend is fascinating in itself, when you put it in the context of what we 
all expect from evidence-based medicine, which is that people will simply use the best 
treatment for the patient . . . . In medicine, brand identities are irrelevant, and there’s a 
factual objective answer to whether one drug is the most likely to improve a patient’s pain, 
suffering and longevity. Marketing, therefore, exists for no reason other than to pervert 
evidence-based decision-making medicine. 
Id.  
 31. Id. 
 32. Manchanda & Honka, supra note 21, at 809 (“While there seems to be little consensus about the size of 
the effect, it is clear that the effect is positive and significant in a statistical sense.”). 
 33. Geoffrey Spurling et al., Information from Pharmaceutical Companies and the Qualtiy, Quantity, and 
Cost of Physicians’ Prescribing: A Systematic Review, PLOS MED (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.plosmedi-
cine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1000352. 
 34. Richard F. Adair & Leah R. Holmgren, Do Drug Samples Influence Resident Prescribing Behavior? A 
Randomized Trial, 118 AM. J. MED. 881 (2005). 
 35. Johar, supra note 8, at 312. 
 36. Spurling et. al., supra note 33, at 3.  
 37. Id. at 4.  
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 5. 
 41. Charles Ornstein et al., Have You Ever Tried to Sell a New Drug?, THE ATLANTIC (June 13, 2013), avail-
able at http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/06/have-you-ever-tried-to-sell-a-new-drug/277204/. 
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the FDA was not aware of “any well-designed studies comparing Bystolic to other beta-
blockers.”42 Forest, however, undertook a “promotional assault,” deploying large numbers 
of pharmaceutical representatives to visit physicians and paying speaker fees to physicians 
who would speak about Bystolic.43 Despite the lack of documented superiority over 
cheaper generic equivalents, Bystolic sold well.44 Of the twenty top Bystolic prescribers 
in the Medicare prescription drug program, seventeen had financial ties to Forest, such as 
the payment of speaker fees.45 The same is true for other drugs.46 Explicit causal links be-
tween marketing and prescribing are naturally elusive, but according to some, “the evi-
dence overwhelmingly suggests that doctors are influenced.”47 To some physicians, the 
high sales of Bystolic were bewildering due to the lack of scientific evidence favoring the 
more expensive drug.48 
2. Pharmaceutical Marketing Results in no Increase in Prescribing Quality—Only 
a Decrease in Prescribing Quality and Increases in Cost 
Do pharmaceutical representative visits cause physicians to overlook or discount 
warnings, or to prescribe inappropriate medications? A few studies have tried to answer 
this question, using prescribing “quality”—measured by guideline adherence, prescribing 
appropriateness of a drug class, and prescribing range.49 In one study, learning about a drug 
first from a pharmaceutical representative was associated with lower prescribing quality, 
whereas the number of representative visits was not associated with lower prescribing 
quality.50 Another study showed an association between self-reported rates of attendance 
at pharmaceutical company-sponsored meetings and slightly lower quality scores, but not 
with self-reported rates of representatives’ visits.51 And, with regard to adherence to pre-
scribing guidelines, one study indicated that more frequent pharmaceutical representative 
visits were associated with less guideline adherence, while one showed no effect.52 Neither 
study, however, showed an increase in guideline adherence with increased pharmaceutical 
visits. 
Significantly, while pharmaceutical companies maintain that pharmaceutical repre-
sentatives provide useful information to physicians, studies do not bear this out. Studies 
do not show that an increase in pharmaceutical representative visits corresponded with any 
                                                          
 42. Warning Letter from FDA to Howard Solomon, CEO of Forest Laboratories (Aug. 28, 2008), available 
at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/EnforcementActivities-
byFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/ucm054010.pdf. 
 43. Ornstein et. al., supra note 41. 
 44. Id. (noting that Bystolic almost doubled its sales to $348 million after the intense marketing efforts). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. (“For example, nine of the top prescribers of the Alzheimers drug Exelon received money from No-
vartis, the drug maker. Eight of the top 10 for Johnson & Johnson painkiller Nucynta were paid speakers, as were 
six of the top ten for Pfizer’s antidepressant Pristiq.”). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. (“‘I’ve no idea how you could come up with a storyline for use of that drug,’ noted Eric Topol, a 
cardiologist and chief academic officer of Scripps Health. ‘I don’t see any purpose for Bystolic whatsoever.’”).  
 49. Spurling et al, supra note 33 at 2. 
 50. Id. at 3. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. 
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increase at all in prescribing quality.53 Indeed, the only effect documented was the oppo-
site. This lack of benefit—and documented downside—suggests that pharmaceutical rep-
resentatives’ visits to physicians are having too great an effect and marketing has been 
allowed to go too far, as pharmaceutical representatives’ visits cause a documented down-
side with no documented upside.54 
B. Pharmaceutical Representatives Offer Carefully Selected  Information that Often 
Downplays the Documented Risks 
First-hand accounts and FDA documents show repeated instances of pharmaceutical 
representatives presenting one-sided information that downplays risks and negates warn-
ings.55 Because many of these interactions occur in private conversations, there is little 
empirical data to indicate how frequently warnings are downplayed or negated by market-
ing activities. The overall picture, however, can be pieced together from information from 
physicians themselves, from retired pharmaceutical representatives, and from documents 
released in litigation. Together, these sources indicate that risks are downplayed all too 
frequently. 
As described in more detail below, every pharmaceutical approved by the FDA must 
have “labeling” that contains the risks and warnings pertinent to that pharmaceutical.56 
The labeling contains the complete prescribing and warning information that must be in-
cluded as a package insert for the pharmaceutical.57 
But the pharmaceutical representative’s oral description of a drug in the physician’s 
office is often a highly selective version of the complete warning information that appears 
in the label.58 Pharmaceutical representatives may, for example, present studies that sup-
port one safety profile while ignoring those that show greater risks, deny that the written 
warnings are a concern, or simply omit warnings.59 
                                                          
 53. Id. Under certain circumstances, though, pharmaceutical marketing could have positive public health re-
sults. In the case of Herceptin, for example, a 2005 study showed that the drug could cut the relapse rate of early 
stage tumors in half. Scott Gottlieb, From FDA, A Good Framework for Distributing Information on Off-Label 
Uses, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Apr. 23, 2008), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2008/04/23/from-fda-a-good-frame-
work-for-distributing-information-on-off-label-uses/. FDA approval of the drug for this use came two years after 
the study’s results; in the meantime, physicians were slow to embrace the drug for this use. Id.  There is a case 
to be made, therefore, that certain limited distribution of study results could have positive effects for patients. Id. 
 54. David Henry, Doctors and Drug Companies: Still Cozy After All These Years, PLOS MED. (2010), avail-
able at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1000359 (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2013). 
 55. See discussion infra Part I.B. 
 56. 21 U.S.C. § 352 (2012). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See, e.g., Barbara Mintzes, PhD, et al., Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives and Patient Safety: A Com-
parative Prospective Study of Information Quality in Canada, France, and the United States, 28 J. GEN. INTERN. 
MED. 1395, 1400 (2013) (noting that in all three countries studied, pharmaceutical representatives rarely in-
formed physicians about serious adverse events and observing a “serious lack of information” in pharmaceutical 
representative discussions about medications). 
 59. In addition, recent False Claims Act settlements between the Department of Justice and pharmaceutical 
companies show examples of these behaviors. See, e.g., United States’ Notice of Intervention for Purposes of 
Settlement, United States ex rel. Wetta v. AstraZeneca Corp., C.A. No. 04-3479 (Apr. 23, 2010) (including alle-
gations that AstraZeneca “promoted the sale and use of Seroquel to psychiatrists, other physicians (including 
primary care physicians) and other health care professionals in pediatric and primary care physician offices, in 
long-term care facilities and hospitals and in prisons for certain uses that were not approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration (including aggression, Alzheimer’s disease, anger management, anxiety, attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder, bipolar maintenance, dementia, depression, mood disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, 
10
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The example of Vioxx illustrates every one of these techniques. Vioxx was an anti-
inflammatory medication manufactured by Merck that had the side effect of increasing the 
risk of cardiac events.60 The risk became well known within Merck early on, but as the 
drug became a blockbuster, Merck applied intense pressure to pharmaceutical representa-
tives to downplay the risks and sell as much Vioxx as possible.61 
On May 5, 2005, the House of Representatives’ Committee on Government Reform 
held hearings into the marketing of Vioxx.62 These hearings yielded 20,000 pages of doc-
uments describing specific actions that pharmaceutical representatives took in marketing 
the product.63 Pharmaceutical representatives were trained in aggressive sales techniques 
in order to distract physicians from the heart risks associated with Vioxx.64 Representatives 
presented only positive information about Vioxx, while downplaying or avoiding the neg-
ative information completely. Training materials showed that pharmaceutical reps were 
taught literally to “dodge” safety questions about Vioxx.65 
The Vioxx case is hardly an anomaly—recent FDA untitled letters, warning letters, 
comments by physicians, and accounts written by former pharmaceutical representatives 
indicate that pharmaceutical representatives all too frequently overstate safety and under-
state warnings, in violation of federal law66: 
 
 Representatives from Forest Laboratories, Inc., broadened the indications 
and minimized risks of its Daliresp (roflumilast) tablets.67 Daliresp had 
been approved to reduce the risk of COPD exacerbations in patients with 
severe COPD associated with chronic bronchitis and a history of exacer-
bations.68 During sales calls, representatives either failed to mention the 
serious side effects (risk of weight loss and psychiatric events including 
suicidality) or responded to direct questions about these side effects with 
anecdotal evidence stating that other physicians were pleased with the 
                                                          
and sleeplessness) . . . recruited doctors to serve as authors of articles largely prepared by medical literature 
companies about studies they did not conduct on unapproved uses of Seroquel; and, used those studies and arti-
cles as the basis for promotional messages about unapproved uses of Seroquel; . . . offered and paid illegal 
remuneration to doctors”); United States’ Complaint in Intervention, United States ex rel. Starr v. Janssen Pharm. 
Prod., No. 04-cv-1529 (Nov. 4, 2013) [collectively hereinafter Settlement Documents] (alleging that Janssen 
marketed Risperdal as resulting in no increased risk of diabetes and that other anti-psychotics did, at the same 
time that Janssen was asked to add a diabetes warning to its label).  
 60. Merck, supra note 28. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. The full transcript is available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg21483/html/CHRG-
109hhrg21483.htm. According to documents releases in the hearings, Merck representatives were instructed to 
use subtle gestures subconsciously to gain the trust of physicians. They were permitted to discuss only approved 
journal articles, defined by Merck as articles that “provide solid evidence as to why doctors should prescribe 
Merck products” and health risks reviewed as “obstacles” that the sales force was instructed to surmount. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 




 68. Id. 
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drug and reported no adverse events at all.69 Significantly, these actions 
took place despite three such letters from the FDA within the previous 
eighteen months, and the fact that Forest was operating under a Corporate 
Integrity Agreement that required Forest to conduct promotional activi-
ties appropriately.70 
 
 In documents released as part of GlaxoSmithKline’s $3 billion fraud set-
tlement, GSK employees described how they promoted medications such 
as Paxil and Wellbutrin for unapproved uses and downplayed safety 
risks.71 
 
 Lawsuits over marketing of anti-psychotic drugs to children show that 
marketing efforts can obscure risks and suggest that higher-priced medi-
cations are indicated when they are not.72 
 
 Pharmaceutical representatives undercut the package insert’s warnings. 
Eli Lilly’s sales representatives, for example, denied that weight gain was 
a problem in connection with Zyprexa, even though that side effect was 
listed on the package insert.73 “They were trying to press hard,” one phy-
sician told the Wall Street Journal, “[t]hey would not acknowledge it was 
a concern.”74 
 
 Pharmaceutical representatives targeted District of Columbia Medicaid 
recipients in their marketing of anti-psychotic drugs, to the point that “it 
is likely that much of the antipsychotic prescribing to D.C. Medicaid ben-
eficiaries may be inappropriate.”75 A report by the government of the Dis-
trict of Columbia on pharmaceutical marketing and prescription of anti-
psychotic drugs to children found that “[a]ntipsychotic manufacturers are 
marketing heavily to District psychiatrists, and appear to be targeting 
                                                          
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Ben Adams, Another Failing, But Will Industry Learn?, PHARMAFILE (Apr. 7, 2012), www.pharma-
file.com/news/173307/gsk-ruling-another-failing-will-industry-learn (explaining how pharmaceutical represent-
atives discussed the use of Paxil in children and downplayed risks, even though GSK had data stating that the 
use of Paxil in people under the age of eighteen was not only ineffective but increased the risk of suicide). 
 72. See Settlement Documents, supra note 59. Every major seller of anti-psychotic drugs has been either un-
der government investigation or has settled lawsuits brought by the government. Duff Wilson, Side Effects May 
Include Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2010 (“Lawyers suing AstraZeneca say documents they have unearthed 
show that the company tried to hide the risks of diabetes and weight gain associated with the new drugs. Positive 
studies were hyped, the documents show; negative ones were filed away.”). 
 73. Rockoff, supra note 5 (noting that several physicians told the Wall Street Journal about instances in which 
sales representatives downplayed or denied warnings). The article notes, however, that in response to federal 
scrutiny and physicians’ impatience with the traditional hard sell pharmaceutical representatives are also soften-
ing their marketing approach towards physicians. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Liz Borkowski et al., Impacts of Pharmaceutical Marketing on Healthcare Services in the District of 
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Medicaid psychiatrists in particular.”76 Medicaid psychiatrists received 
66 percent of all pharmaceutical gifts and payments to psychiatrists, alt-
hough they represented only 26 percent of the psychiatrists.77 One in ten 
D.C. Medicaid recipients received an anti-psychotic prescription, a rate 
five times higher than the national population.78 
 
 In a single brochure that Shire gave to kidney patients about Fosrenol, the 
FDA said the company committed four separate violations: It left out the 
risk warnings, which include Crohn’s disease and bowel obstruction.79 It 
said Fosrenol was safer and more effective than other drugs, while the 
FDA saw no evidence to support comparative claims like that.80 It said 
Fosrenol could prevent “bone disease, heart disease or death,” when there 
was no evidence supporting that conclusion.81 
 
 In one case of literally hiding the risks, Shire Pharmaceuticals was warned 
that a promotional magnet it was distributing did not comply with regu-
lations regarding promotional materials.82 The magnet included the ad-
vantages and risks associated with Vyvanse, a medication designed to 
treat Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) in children.83 The 
magnet also functioned as a business card holder—but when a card was 
inserted, the card obscured all the warnings, leaving only the advantages 
visible.84 The FDA sent a warning letter to Shire, asking that it discon-
tinue use of the magnet.85 
 
 Even CEOs have drawn warning letters for failing to mention serious 
risks while promoting drugs. The CEO of Aegerion Pharmaceuticals ap-
peared twice on the CNBC show “Fast Money,” promoting the com-
pany’s Juxtapid drug, and making “substantial and repeated claims of ef-
ficacy . . . without any of the risks associated with these new intended 
uses.”86 
 
                                                          
 76. Id. at 36-42. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 34. 




 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Warning Letter from FDA to Shire Pharmaceuticals (June 20, 2011), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/Warn-
ingLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/ucm259167.htm. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.   
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II. A HOST OF REGULATIONS AND NEW ETHICS INITIATIVES DO NOT DECREASE 
AGGRESSIVE MARKETING AND ANTI-WARNINGS 
Pharmaceutical manufacturers are subject to federal regulations and the FDA’s au-
thority to enforce them. Yet pharmaceutical representatives are still able to present one-
sided information about their products by appealing to physicians directly and in person, 
in the context of cozy relationships. The FDA’s enforcement mechanisms—characterized 
by repeated warnings and opportunities to comply—have come to be regarded as slaps on 
the hand that are part of doing business. 
A. Extensive Regulations Apply to Pharmaceutical Labeling and Promotional 
Materials 
The FDA is responsible for approving pharmaceutical labeling and for regulating 
pharmaceutical marketing.87 Several significant federal statutes and a number of regula-
tions apply to pharmaceutical sales and marketing.88 
Modern federal regulation of pharmaceuticals began with the 1906 Pure Food and 
Drugs Act.89 The regulations later developed further, largely in response to a series of pub-
lic health crises caused by unsafe medications.90 In 1937, a new pediatric sulfanilamide 
drug killed over one hundred people, many of them children. The public reaction resulted 
in a legislative safety mandate for drugs, as well as a prohibition on false therapeutic 
claims.91 The resulting Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (“FDCA”) requires 
that safety of new drugs be tested and that the FDA be notified before the new drug is 
brought to market.92 
  Another public health tragedy brought further regulation, this time caused by the 
morning sickness drug, thalidomide.93 Thalidomide caused stillbirths and limb malfor-
mations in babies.94 Reacting to this disaster, Congress in 1962 changed the way the FDA 
regulated new drugs so as to require “premarket approval of the safety and effectiveness 
                                                          
 87. John P. Swann, FDA’s Origin, FDA (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/His-
tory/Origin/ucm124403.htm (noting that “[s]tates exercised the principal control over domestically produced and 
distributed foods and drugs in the 19th century, control that was markedly inconsistent from state to state”). 
Regulation of pharmaceuticals began in the United States as a matter handled on an inconsistent, state-by-state 
basis. Id. Today, regulation of pharmaceuticals takes place principally at the federal level, through the FDA. Id.   
 88. The Controlled Substances Act, the Poison Prevention Packaging Act, the Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1990), and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) together with associated 
regulations, are part of the federal government’s regulation of pharmaceuticals and pharmacies. See THOMAS R. 
FULDAN & ALBERT I. WERTHEIMER, PH.D, HANDBOOK OF PHARMACEUTICAL PUBLIC POLICY (Haworth Press 
2007); The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A) & (B); the Federal Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 
1320a-7b; Stark, and the FDCA also apply. 
 89. Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed by Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (1938), Pub. L. No. 
75-717, 1938, 52 Stat. 1059). 
 90. Swann, supra note 87. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-300 (2000)). 
 93. The Independent Institute, History of Federal Regulation: 1902-Present, FDAREVIEW.ORG, available at 
http://www.fdareview.org/history.shtml (last visited Aug. 11, 2013). 
 94. Id. (stating that thalidomide was a treatment for morning sickness that led to stillbirths and birth defects, 
particularly limb malformations).  
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of every new drug.”95 Approval of a new pharmaceutical now requires clinical trials96 and 
a New Drug Application.97 The NDA permits FDA to balance the safety and efficacy of 
the new drug, to assess the risks, and to determine appropriate warnings.98 To fund the 
application process, pharmaceutical companies pay a fee.99 
Federal regulations emphasize the need for thorough and complete warnings accom-
panying each pharmaceutical. The regulations call for proper “labeling,” which, by defi-
nition, includes all labels and any written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon any article 
or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article.100 The labeling must 
portray the drug’s safety profile with “accuracy, balance, and brevity.”101 In doing so, the 
manufacturer must include a full description of the drug, as well as safety information 
concerning indications and usage, dosage, and administration.102 
With regard to warning information, the labeling must contain the “boxed warnings” 
and other cautionary language, such as “[r]ecent major changes,” which includes newly 
authorized language, and “[c]ontraindications,” which includes situations or conditions 
under which the pharmaceutical in question should not be prescribed.103 The labeling con-
tains a separate section specifically for “warnings and precautions.”104 This section should 
include the most significant information that would affect a prescriber’s decision to select 
this particular pharmaceutical for a particular patient.105 All “material” information must 
be included.106 
A drug’s labeling is often controversial and dynamic rather than static. That is, when 
                                                          
 95. See Kefauver-Harris Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 
321-399 (2000)). 
 96. The manufacturer must present “substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it purports or is 
represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed label-
ing,” 21 U.S.C. § 355(d)(5). The NDA shall include: (1) reports of the clinical trials and testing done to determine 
the safety and effectiveness of the drug; (2) the complete ingredients or components of the drug; (3) the compo-
sition of the drug; (4) a complete description of the manufacturing, processing, and packaging methods and con-
trols; (5) samples of the drug and its components (if requested); and (6) samples of the proposed labeling, 21 
U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012). 
 97. To obtain approval for a new drug, the manufacturer must first submit an investigational new-drug appli-
cation (“IND”) to the FDA. The IND must include information about the drug’s chemistry, manufacturing, phar-
macology, and toxicology, see 21 U.S.C. § 355(b); 21 C.F.R. § 312.21. The IND must also include information 
about the animal pharmacology and toxicology of the drug, and details regarding the protocols for human testing. 
 98. Victor E. Schwartz, Phil Goldberg, A Prescription for Drug Liability and Regulation, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 
135, 141 (2005) (citing Victor E. Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Clarifying the Meaning and Policy 
Behind Comment k, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1142 (1985) (noting that “[a] principal focus of the Food 
and Drug Administration, apart from safety, is efficacy. Since every drug includes some risks, the Food and Drug 
Administration regards efficacy as essential—if one is to take risks, he or she should obtain the desired result.”)). 
 99. Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-571, 106 Stat. 4491 (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 
379g, 379h (2000)). 
 100. 21 U.S.C. 321(m) (2012). 
 101. 21 C.F.R. pt. 201 (2005) (setting out the requirements for pharmaceutical labeling, such as substantive 
requirements and requirements that warnings be suitably prominent and in certain fonts).  
 102. Id. § 201.57(a). 
 103. Id. § 201.57(a)(9). 
 104. Id. § 201.57(a)(10). This section should include “[a] concise summary of the most clinically significant 
information required under paragraph (c)(6)[.]” Id.  
 105. Id. 
 106. 21 C.F.R. 1.21 (2005) (“(a) Labeling of a food, drug, device, cosmetic, or tobacco product shall be deemed 
to be misleading if it fails to reveal facts that are:  (1) Material in light of other representations made or suggested 
by statement, word, design, device or any combination thereof; or (2) Material with respect to consequences 
which may result from use of the article under: (i) The conditions prescribed in such labeling or (ii) such condi-
tions of use as are customary or usual.”). 
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the label is first created, it may be the subject of intense negotiation between the pharma-
ceutical manufacturer and the FDA. In addition, the label may be amended over the life of 
the drug, as people use the drug in greater numbers and for a longer period of time than in 
clinical trials.107 This broader use often results in the discovery of additional safety infor-
mation that must be added to the label.108 These amendments too are often hotly contested, 
taking months to enact.109 The FDA may, for example, request that the manufacturer in-
clude certain specific information, but the manufacturer may argue against the inclusion 
of the requested information, or ask that other information be included. The result is usu-
ally a negotiated version in which the parties arrive at a final version acceptable to both 
sides.110 
In terms of written warnings, particularly the package insert that must be preap-
proved by the FDA, the language is carefully chosen and vetted. As discussed below, how-
ever, the emphasis on the package insert is no more than paper compliance when pharma-
ceutical representatives can undermine and deny these carefully crafted warnings. 
B.  Promotion and Advertising are Regulated 
Like drug labeling, drug promotion is regulated by the FDA.111 Promotion, including 
pharmaceutical representatives’ interactions with physicians, is regulated by laws, poli-
cies, and ethical guidelines at the federal and state levels. Federal regulations and guidance 
governing pharmaceutical representatives are issued by the FDA and Office of the Inspec-
tor General (OIG).112 
Promotional labeling is information given to consumers or prescribers directly, 
while advertising is usually broadcast on television or radio, or published in newspapers 
or magazines.113 Among the regulations are those addressing the “brief summary” and 
“true statement” requirements.114 A statement fails to be a “true statement” if it is false or 
misleading with respect to side effects, contraindications, or effectiveness, if it fails to 
provide a “fair balance” of information on these subjects, or if it does not provide material 
                                                          
 107. See, e.g., David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt 
Failure-to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 466 (2008).  
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 480 (“[T]he FDA acknowledges that it took over a year to force Merck, the manufacturer of Vioxx, 
to add a warning of the risks of heart attack and stroke to Vioxx’s label. During the lengthy negotiations, no 
change was made to Vioxx’s label, and in the end, the FDA settled for a weaker warning than it had proposed.”). 
 110. Id. 
 111. The FDA is responsible for “preventing misbranding of . . . drugs . . . shipped in interstate commerce,” 
as well as the “regulation of truth or falsity of prescription drug advertising.” FDA, Memorandum of Understand-
ing Between the Federal Trade Commission and the Food and Drug Administration, MOU 225-71-8003 (1971), 
available at http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/PartnershipsCollaborations/MemorandaofUnderstanding-
MOUs/DomesticMOUs/ucm115791.htm (last updated Mar. 10, 2009). 
 112. 21 C.F.R. 200-203 (2013). See, e.g., Guidance for Industry: Industry-Supported Scientific and Educa-
tional Activities, HHS-
FDA (Nov. 1997), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/RegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM125602.pdf; OIG 
Compliance Program Guidance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, HHS-OIG (Apr. 18, 
2003), https://oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/03/050503FRCPGPharmac.pdf. 
 113. The FDCA does not define “advertising,” but the regulations list items that are regulated as advertise-
ments, such as “advertisements in published journals, magazines, other periodicals, and newspapers, and adver-
tisements broadcast through media such as radio, television, and telephone communications systems.” 21 C.F.R. 
§ 202.1(1)(1) (2013); Drug Advertising: A Glossary of Terms, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/Re-
sourcesForYou/Consumers/PrescriptionDrugAdvertising/ucm072025.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2013). 
 114. 21 C.F.R. 202.1(e)(3)-(7). 
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facts about the drug’s use or representations made in the advertisement.115 
The FDA monitors advertising and takes action when companies violate the regula-
tions.116 To enforce its regulations, a division of the FDA known as the Office of Prescrip-
tion Drug Promotion (OPDP) monitors prescription drug promotion for compliance with 
the law, and reviews Form FDA-2253 submissions. OPDP representatives attend confer-
ences and collect promotional materials for review, send warning letters, and take other 
enforcement actions, such as recalls, seizures, injunctions, administrative detentions, and 
criminal prosecutions.117 The states also regulate pharmaceutical representatives; some of 
these regulations are stricter than those at the federal level.118 
C.  Self-Policing and Ethics Policies have made some Inroads but Remain Incomplete 
Recognizing that pharmaceutical marketing can present conflicts of interest, some 
major academic medical centers, industry organizations, and health insurance companies 
have developed their own ethics rules or guidelines addressing contact between pharma-
ceutical representatives and healthcare providers. While these rules and guidelines repre-
sent positive progress, they are either non-binding or do not reach far enough to disrupt 
the relationship between the pharmaceutical industry and healthcare providers. In 2002, 
the pharmaceutical industry organization, PhRMA, adopted its Code on Interactions with 
Healthcare Professionals, which was revised in 2008.119 Many of the signatories, however, 
also appear on the Office of the Inspector General’s list of companies with corporate in-
tegrity agreements or negotiated settlements with the OIG.120 The fact that the corporate 
integrity agreements mainly post-date the 2008 Code indicates that the Code has not solved 
the problem of physician-representative interactions.121 National organizations have also 
                                                          
 115. Bruce N. Kuhlik, The FDA’s Regulation of Pharmaceutical Communications in the Context of Managed 
Care: A Suggested Approach, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 23, 38 (1995) (“[f]air balance” means that the materials 
contain “overall, a balanced presentation of the risks and benefits that can affect a health care practitioner’s 
decision to prescribe the promoted product.”). 
 116. One exception to the usual lack of preapproval is when the advertising concerns a drug that can be fatal, 
and the risk of fatality has not been widely publicized in the medical literature. 21 C.F.R. §202.1(j)(1). 
 117. KATHLEEN M. BOOZANG & SIMONE HANDLER-HUTCHINSON, PHARMACEUTICAL & MEDICAL DEVICE 
COMPLIANCE MANUAL 192 (2012). As one example, the FDA issued a warning letter where a mailer for Cym-
balta did not include the necessary warnings and overstated effectiveness. The mailer also indicated that the 
recipient would be receiving a leather desk letter holder. Letter from FDA to Eli Lilly and Company (Jan. 7, 
2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Enforce-
mentActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompa-
nies/ucm054170.pdf7. 
 118. Safe Rx Amendment Act of 2008, D.C. CODE § 48-844 (2008) (stating that the District of Columbia 
requires pharmaceutical representatives to be licensed to sell pharmaceuticals).  
 119. Code on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals, PHRMA,  available at http://phrma.org/sites/de-
fault/files/pdf/SignatoryCompaniesCodeonInteractionswithHealthcareProfessionals.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 
2013) (the code “reaffirms that interactions between pharmaceutical company representatives and healthcare 
professionals should be focused on informing the healthcare professionals about products,  
providing scientific and educational information, and supporting medical research and education”).  
 120. List of Companies with Corporate Integrity Agreements, OIG, available at http://oig.hhs.gov/compli-
ance/corporate-integrity-agreements/cia-documents.asp (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
 121. Id. 
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issued guidelines for pharmaceutical representative-physician interactions, although com-
pliance with these is—with certain exceptions122—voluntary.123 Indeed, one consultant de-
scribes the guidelines as a prophylactic attempt against further external regulation: “[The 
set of guidelines] is an attempt to self-police and thereby ward off further external re-
strictions.”124 
In addition, individual hospitals, academic medical centers, or practices may also 
have guidelines addressing interactions between pharmaceutical sales representatives and 
physicians. These range from requirements that visitors register in advance to strict rules 
for pharmaceutical representatives’ behavior, and access to physicians. These regula-
tions—together with other factors such as physicians’ increasingly busy schedules—have 
resulted in an increase in physicians’ refusing to see pharmaceutical representatives.125 
Pharmaceutical representatives continue to press for access, however, and are urged to 
consider alternative avenues of contact, such as on-demand media and other points of con-
tact.126 
When others question the value of pharmaceutical industry/physician interactions, 
physicians often cite an educational value of these contacts.127 The vast number of studies 
and trials that are published on a daily basis are all but overwhelming for a busy physician 
seeking to stay abreast of the newest information. But industry detailing is not the only 
approach to disseminating information about new drugs. Another recently-developed ap-
proach called “academic detailing” aims to disseminate information gleaned from medical 
literature and assessed in a “non-product-given” way.128 In this fashion, a non-profit or-
ganization such as the Independent Drug Information Service disseminates information to 
physicians.129 
                                                          
 122. A handful of states have incorporated the PhRMA code as part of their state laws. For example, Nevada 
requires that pharmaceutical companies adopt the PhRMA code or another code that would  
[Establish] the practices and standards that govern the marketing and sale of its products. 
The marketing code of conduct must be based on applicable legal standards and incorpo-
rate principles of health care, including, without limitation, requirements that the activities 
of the wholesaler or manufacturer be intended to benefit patients, enhance the practice of 
medicine and not interfere with the independent judgment of health care professionals.  
NEV. REV. STAT. § 639.570 (2007).    
 123. The Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education (ACCME) has issued restrictions on the 
extent to which pharmaceutical sales representatives can participate in medical education. Standards for Com-
mercial Support, ACCME, www.accme.org/requirements/accreditation-requirements-cme-providers/standards-
for-commercial-support (last visited December 28, 2012).   
 124. Wendy Heckelman, The Changing Pharmaceutical Sales Landscape (Oct. 7, 2009), available at 
http://www.pharmexec.com/pharmexec/Sales/The-Changing-Pharmaceutical-Sales-Landscape/ArticleStand-
ard/Article/detail/632252?contextCategoryId=47505. 
 125. Drug Makers Try Cures for Physician “Cold Shoulders”, ZS ASSOCIATES, http://www.zsassoci-
ates.com/about/news-and-events/drug-makers-try-cures.aspx (last visited Dec. 28, 2012). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Physician Payment Sunshine Act: Physicians and life sciences coming to terms with transparency?, 
DELOITTE (2012), https://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Global/Local%20Assets/Docu-
ments/LSHC/dttl_lshc_ForbesInsightsLSHCTransparencyReport.pdf (noting that physicians believe industry-
sponsored continuing medical education is useful for learning about new medications); Johar, supra note 8, at 
330 (“Interactions between physicians and representatives can be positive, informative, balanced, and provide 
information that will help patients”). 
 128. Jerry Avorn, Healing the Overwhelmed Physician, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2013, at A27 (noting that “even 
the most superbly assemble evidence doesn’t disseminate itself”). 
 129. The Independent Drug Information Service is funded by the governments of Pennsylvania and the District 
of Columbia. Independent Drug Information Source (IDIS), ALOSA, http://www.alosafoundation.org/independ-
ent-drug-information-service/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2014). Other health systems such as that of Australia and 
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D.  FDA’s Collaborative Approach to Enforcement Leaves Gaps for Non-Compliance 
Compliance with these regulations and guidelines has been uneven. The FDA has 
broad powers to enforce its regulations thought a variety of means, including untitled let-
ters, warning letters, fines, and consent decrees,130 as well as seizure of misbranded phar-
maceuticals.131 The Office of the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services can also enforce misconduct where Health and Human Services programs 
such as Medicare and Medicaid are involved.132 
Two factors combine, however, to make enforcement difficult: first, the sheer scale 
of the promotional effort makes enforcement challenging—there are 81,000 pharmaceuti-
cal representatives in the United States133 and countless conferences and presentations in 
which marketing takes place. Second, when pharmaceutical marketing efforts do violate 
the rules, the FDA’s first step in compliance is generally to ask the company to cease the 
offensive actions.134 That is, before taking more drastic actions, the FDA often issues an 
untitled letter or warning letter setting out the violation and asking the company to stop 
taking the offending action.135 The offending company is then expected to stop taking the 
offensive action, but no other penalty is applied—compliance is voluntary.136 Signifi-
cantly, though, the FDA is not in physicians’ offices and cannot monitor the thousands of 
in-person encounters between physicians and representatives.137 
Officials at the FDA have observed that companies take a calculated approach to 
warning letters, simply accepting warning letters as part of doing business and doing little 
or nothing in response.138 This corporate approach, while undesirable from a safety per-
spective, is perhaps logical, considering that even repeated failures to comply with the 
                                                          
Kaiser Permanente, have adopted this approach to disseminating information about new drugs. Id. After all, if 
pharmaceutical marketing results in the prescription of more and more expensive medications, counter-acting 
such marketing would result in very significant cost savings. Funding of such a system might well prove worth 
an investment by insurers and governments paying for these medications. 
 130. BOOZANG & HANDLER-HUTCHINSON, supra,note 118, at 8.   
 131. 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) (2012). 
 132. BOOZANG & HANDLER-HUTCHINSON, supra note 118, at 301. 
 133. Debra Gordon, Dealing with Drug Reps, PHYSICIANS PRACTICE, http://www.physicianspractice.com/ar-
ticles/dealing-drug-reps (last visited July 20, 2013). 
 134. MICHAEL E. CLARK, PHARMACEUTICAL LAW: REGULATION OF RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND 
MARKETING 22 (2007). 
 135. See FDA Initiates Seizure of Potentially Dangerous Drugs from Repackager, FDA NEWS (Sept. 15, 
2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2003/NEW00945.html. Warning letters are available 
at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/wlcfm/sindex.cfm. 
 136. “Warning letters are issued to achieve voluntary compliance and to establish prior notice . . . Warning 
letters are issued only for violations of regulatory significance. Significant violations . . . may lead to enforcement 
action if not promptly and adequately corrected. A Warning Letter is the agency’s principal means of achieving 
prompt voluntary compliance with the . . . [FDCA].”  FDA Regulatory Procedures Manual §4-1-1 (“Warning 
Letter Procedures”) (2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/ora/compliance_ref/rpm/; CLARK, supra note 134, 
at 227 (noting that “[t]he FDA ordinarily uses a stair-step approach to enforce the FDCA, first trying to get 
members of the regulated community to voluntarily comply with the requirements of the FDCA and its imple-
menting regulations before using stricter measures.”). 
 137. Kate Greenwood, The Ban on “Off-Label” Pharmaceutical Promotion: Constitutionally Permissible 
Prophylaxis Against False or Misleading Commercial Speech?, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 278, 296 (2011) (noting 
pharmaceutical companies’ difficulties in self-monitoring under these circumstances). 
 138. Schering-Plough GMP Consent Decree Puts Drug Industry on Notice, The Food & Drug Letter 1, June 
7, 2002, available at http://brucegoldfarb.com/FDL1.pdf (noting that “‘[t]he agency has allowed itself to get into 
this situation of issuing warning letter after warning letter to the same company, without taking any action,’ said 
Eric Blumberg, the FDA’s deputy chief counsel for litigation, who signed the decree. ‘The FDA has tried to send 
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regulations often draw no penalty other than a request to “cease violative promotional ac-
tivities.”139 
In the case of Vioxx, for example, the downplaying of risks took place long after 
Merck received a warning letter on September 17, 2001 asking it to cease its downplaying 
of warnings.140 And even when companies are under negotiated agreements known as 
“corporate integrity agreements,” in which companies agree to strengthen their compliance 
program, overly-aggressive marketing and downplaying of warnings may still continue. A 
recently filed case against Novartis suggests that its corporate integrity agreement did little 
to curtail a speaker program that was allegedly no more than a vehicle to give prescribers 
money and lavish meals.141 
Likewise, a corporate integrity agreement did not dissuade Forest Laboratories, Inc., 
from overstating benefits, downplaying risks, and broadening the indications of its Da-
liresp (roflumilast) tablets.142 Significantly, these actions took place despite three previous 
such letters from the FDA within the previous eighteen months, and the fact that Forest 
was operating under a Corporate Integrity Agreement that specifically mentioned the need 
to conduct promotional activities appropriately.143 Hospira also received multiple warning 
letters that seemed to have no impact on its activities.144 
In one recent effort, the FDA has asked physicians to inform the FDA if pharmaceu-
tical representatives downplay risks.145 Reporting physicians can remain anonymous if 
                                                          
the message out that that’s not going to happen anymore.’”).  
 139. Letter from FDA, supra, note 68 (where, for example, Forest Laboratories, Inc., allegedly violated its 
Corporate Integrity Agreement by broadening the indications and minimized risks of the drug Daliresp 
(roflumilast) tablets, it was asked simply to “cease” these activities, despite the fact that it had received three 
such letters from the FDA within the previous eighteen months). 
 140. Warning Letter from FDA to Merck (Sept. 17, 2001), available at http://www.fda.gov/down-
loads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersand-
NoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/UCM166383.pdf; Letter from Representative Harry Wax-
man to the Democratic Members of the Government Reform Committee at 28-29 (May 5, 2005), available at 
http://oversight-archive.waxman.house.gov/documents/20050505114932-41272.pdf (citing MERCK, CHAMPION 
SELLING: MILESTONE LEADER’S GUIDE (Jan. 2002)). 
 141. The government alleges as follows:  
[E]ven after entering into the corporate integrity agreement, Novartis’s compliance pro-
gram failed to prevent kickbacks from being paid in conjunction with Novartis’s speaker 
programs. No individual at the company was tasked with examining its speaker program 
data to determine whether the programs were used for an illegitimate purpose. Further-
more, although instances of speaker program abuse were reported to Novartis, sanctions 
were generally mere slaps on the wrist. In some cases, sales representatives who violated 
Novartis’s own speaker program policies were nevertheless promoted. Even after Septem-
ber 2010, Novartis continued to conduct bogus speaker programs that were simply vehi-
cles for paying kickbacks to doctors in the form of honoraria and expensive meals.  
Ed Silverman, Did Novartis Violate Its Corporate Integrity Agreement?, FORBES (Apr. 27, 2013), available at   
http://www.forbes.com/sites/edsilverman/2013/04/27/did-novartis-violate-its-corporate-integrity-agreement/.  
 142. Letter from FDA, supra, note 68. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Ed Silverman, Another Day, Another Warning Letter for Hospira but Will FDA Issue a Consent Decree? 
FORBES (May, 31, 2013), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/edsilverman/2013/05/31/another-day-an-
other-warning-letter-for-hospira-but-will-the-fda-issue-a-consent-decree/. 
 145.  The FDA’s website describes the Bad Ad program as follows:  
FDA’s Bad Ad program is an outreach program designed to educate healthcare providers 
about the role they can play in helping the agency make sure that prescription drug adver-
tising and promotion is truthful and not misleading.  The Bad Ad Program is administered 
by the agency’s Office of Prescription Drug Promotion (OPDP) in the Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research. The program’s goal is to help raise awareness among healthcare 
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they prefer to do so.146 While physicians, as the recipients of the potentially bad infor-
mation, certainly have access to the improper information, this manner of enforcement is 
problematic at best, given that pharmaceutical representatives work hard to create a rela-
tionship with physicians. And, according to one survey, however, only three out of ten 
health care providers were aware of the program, and some physicians indicated that it is 
unrealistic to expect them to act as enforcers of the FDA’s rules.147 
Thus, despite the extensive number of regulations and efforts to enforce them, over-
promotion of pharmaceuticals and understatement of warnings continue to take place. 
III. COURTS SHOULD CONSIDER BOTH WARNINGS AND ANTI-WARNINGS 
Those who are harmed by a pharmaceutical company’s failure-to-warn can sue in 
state court under theories of tort liability. In a failure-to-warn case, plaintiffs allege insuf-
ficiency of the warnings concerning a pharmaceutical’s side effects or use. Failure-to-warn 
cases are difficult to win, however, because courts tend to focus on the package insert as 
the “reasonable” warning, rather than pharmaceutical representatives’ statements about the 
dangers. As set out below, this narrow focus on the package insert is problematic because 
it ignores the actual flow of information to physicians regarding the safety and appropri-
ateness of a particular medication. Instead of narrowly focusing on the package insert, 
courts should take all the warning and anti-warning information, including safety-related 
marketing information, into account when deciding the reasonableness of a warning. 
A. Failure-To-Warn Liability Turns on the Presence of a  “Reasonable” Warning 
Generally, a person who supplies a dangerous product directly or through another 
person or entity is liable for damage caused by the product.148 Comment b to Section 6 of 
the Third Restatement of Torts crafts a basis for prescription drug-related liability, taking 
into account that prescription drugs are inherently dangerous and cannot be made com-
pletely safe, even when used for their intended purpose.149 
A pharmaceutical manufacturer can be held liable for failure to warn if the manu-
facturer does not provide an accurate picture of the dangers associated with the product. 
                                                          
providers about misleading prescription drug promotion and provide them with an easy 
way to report this activity to the agency: e-mail BadAd@fda.gov or call 855-RX-BADAD.  
Truthful Prescription Drug Advertising and Promotion, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplian-
ceRegulatoryInformation/Surveillance/DrugMarketingAdvertisingandCommunications/ucm209384.htm (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2013).  
 146. Id. 
 147. How Are Physicians Responding to FDA’s Bad Ad Program?, PR WEB (Mar. 4, 2011), available at  
http://www.prweb.com/releases/doctordirectory/badad/prweb8105854.htm (noting survey results in which some 
physicians stated unwillingness to inform on pharmaceutical representatives, while others said they would do so 
if necessary; others noted the lack of time in physicians’ schedules and physicians’ concerns with following 
regulations themselves rather than worrying about enforcing regulations regarding others’ behavior). 
 148. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1973) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
388 (1965); A person who supplies a dangerous product directly or through another person or entity is liable for 
damaged caused by the product, if the product is used as intended by those expected to use it and the supplier 
“(a) knows or has reason to know that the [product] is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is 
supplied, and (b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the [product] is supplied will realize its dan-
gerous condition, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the 
facts which make it likely to be dangerous.”). 
 149. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. b (1998).  
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The Third Restatement of Torts explains that to be considered reasonably safe, “reasonable 
instructions or warnings” must be given to prescribing healthcare providers.150 With regard 
to warnings, therefore, the test is one of reasonableness under the circumstances rather 
than strict liability.151 The following are factors that determine whether a warning is ade-
quate as a matter of law: (1) The warning must state the significant risks involved and be 
factually correct;152 (2) the warning must have the physical attributes such that a reasona-
bly prudent person would be alerted to the dangers;153 (3) the warning must communicate 
the seriousness of the harm that may result; (4) the warning cannot be ambiguous, equiv-
ocal, or contradictory;154 (5) the warning should be easily understood by the intended au-
dience; and (6) the warning should be communicated by the most appropriate means.155 
The mere mention of a possible injury or side effect may not be adequate.156 When the 
court considers the warning to consist of the package insert and nothing else, analysis of 
the package insert using these factors usually results in the warning being found sufficient, 
provided that the risk at issue was included in the insert. 
Significantly, this warning need not be given to pharmaceutical manufacturers’ ulti-
mate customers—patients.157 This doctrine, known as the “learned intermediary” defense, 
                                                          
 150. The Restatement defines a failure-to-warn defect as follows: “A prescription drug or medical device is 
not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings regarding 
foreseeable risks of harm are not provided to: (1) prescribing and other [healthcare] providers who are in a posi-
tion to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings; or (2) the patient when the 
manufacturer knows or has reason to know the [healthcare] providers will not be in a position to reduce the risks 
of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings,” id. at § 6(d). 
 151. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, Learned Intermediaries and Sophisticated Users: Encouraging the Use of 
Intermediaries to Transmit Product Safety Information, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1185, 1192 (1996). See also Bro-
chu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 657 (1st Cir. 1981) (“An adequate warning is one reasonable under 
the circumstances.”); Graham v. Wyeth Lab., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1498 (D. Kan. 1987) (“An adequate warning is 
one that is reasonable under the circumstances.”); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman, 388 N.E.2d 541, 553 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1979) (“To be adequate, a warning must be reasonable under the circumstances.”). 
 152. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 939 F.2d 1293, 1300 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that “a manufacturer or dis-
tributor ‘fulfills its duty to warn in this context only if it warns of all dangers associated with its products of 
which it has actual or constructive knowledge.”) (quoting Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 
1320 (5th Cir. 1985)); Deines v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 755 F. Supp. 350, 353 (D. Kan. 1990) (“The manufacturer’s 
duty is to warn of all potential dangers which it knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, 
to exist.”);  In re Meridia, 328 F. Supp. 2d 791, 812 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (citing Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d 
425, 429 (Tenn. 1994)) (noting that a pharmaceutical company’s warning to physicians is considered adequate 
if it “contain[s] a full and complete disclosure of the potential adverse reactions to the drug.”).  
 153. Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831 (Ohio 1981) (“A warning is adequate . . . where, under all 
the circumstances, it reasonably discloses to the medical profession all risks inherent in the use of the drug which 
the manufacturer knew or should have known to exist.”). 
 154. See, e.g., Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977) (a warning for an oral polio vaccine 
was potentially inadequate where it stated the risk of paralysis was one in three million, but then cast doubt on 
the causal link between the vaccine and the paralysis); Salmon v. Park, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4th 
Cir. 2012) (statement expressing doubt about causal connection between chloramphenicol and aplastic anemia 
diluted a disclosure stating the need to take precautions against anemia). As explained in further detail above, 
supra Section I.B, a warning may also be diluted by subsequent advertising and promotional activities which 
downplay the product’s risks. See Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 662 (Cal. 1973) (warning pro-
vided to physicians by drug company about the risk of aplastic anemia from administration of Chloromycetin 
antibiotic to patients was nullified by subsequent overpromotion); Incolligo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 220 (Pa. 
1971) (warning provided to physicians by drug company about the risk of aplastic anemia from administration 
of Chloromycetin antibiotic to patients was nullified by subsequent overpromotion). 
 155. Id. 
 156. In re Meridia, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 812 (citing Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 267 (5th Cir. 
2002)).   
 157. The relevant party to be warned is the prescriber rather than the actual patient who takes the prescription 
drug, unless the manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the prescriber is not in a position to reduce the 
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absolves suppliers of medical prescriptions of any duty to warn patients, so long as the 
suppliers have given the prescribing doctor sufficient warning of the drug’s potential dan-
gers. The physician thereby acts as an intermediary “between the company and the patient 
in protecting the patient and in providing direct information about the drug to the pa-
tient.”158 According to this theory, the physician, rather than the patient, understands which 
pharmaceutical is best for the patient, bearing in mind the patient’s particular background, 
medical history, and other medications. The physician is therefore the person to whom any 
warnings should be directed.159 Patients do not have the proper medical background to 
select their own medications—the selection and understanding of any particular medica-
tion requires understanding and training, and that necessitates the intervention of a physi-
cian.160 
B. The Package Insert Should not be the Sole Focus 
In most failure-to-warn cases, the court resolves the adequacy-of-warning issue by 
focusing exclusively, or all but exclusively, on the package insert. This focus is neither 
required by the restatement nor called-for, in view of the realities of communication about 
warnings. And, as set out below, warning information about pharmaceuticals comes to 
physicians through a variety of sources—first and foremost through sources such as the 
Physicians’ Desk Reference (“PDR”), a reference book containing the prescription drugs’ 
labels exactly as they were approved by the FDA.161 Physicians also receive direct mail 
from pharmaceutical companies including “Dear Doctor” letters, and package inserts that 
also state the warnings, side effects, and other information about each pharmaceutical.162 
1. Focus on the Package Insert Ignores the Warning-Diluting Information that 
Reaches Physicians through Pharmaceutical Marketing 
As described above, pharmaceutical company representatives offer physicians 
lunches and copious amounts of information. The examples of pharmaceutical represent-
atives downplaying warnings during these meetings are numerous, and further examples 
                                                          
risk according to the label. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 6(d)(2) (1998). 
 158.  MacPherson v. Searle & Co., 775 F. Supp. 417, 422-23 (quoting WILLIAM J. CURRAN, MARK A. HALL & 
DAVOID H. KAYE, HEALTH CARE LAW, FORENSIC SCIENCE, AND PUBLIC POLICY (4th ed. 1990)). See also Dietz 
v. Smithklink Beecham Corp., 598 F.3d 812, 815 (11th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the physician “has a duty to 
warn the patient’s doctor, who acts as a learned intermediary between the patient and the manufacturer”). 
 159. See, e.g., Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831 (Ohio 1981). 
 160. Martin v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 354 (Ohio 1996) (noting that “[p]rescription drugs are 
likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in formula and varied in effect. As a medical expert, the prescribing 
physician can take into account the propensities of the drug as well as the susceptibilities of his patient. His is 
the task of weighing the benefits of any medication against its potential dangers. The choice he makes is an 
informed one . . . .”). 
 161. See Foreword to PHYSICIANS’ DESK REFERENCE (59th ed. 2005). The PDR also includes “indications, 
hazards, contraindications, side effects, and precautions” for each entry. Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. §201.100(d)(1) 
(2005)). 
 162. FDA Draft Guidance for Industry, Dear Health Care Provider Letters: Improving Communication of 
Important Safety Information, FDA (issued Nov. 12, 2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/down-
loads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/UCM233769.pdf  (“Dear Doctor” letters 
inform doctors and other health care providers about information that “could affect the decision to use a drug or 
require some change in behavior by health care practitioners, patients, or caregivers to reduce the potential for 
harm from a drug”). 
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come to light on a near-constant basis.163 Yet the warnings that the court considers in a 
failure-to-warn lawsuit are most often limited to those contained in the package insert.164 
Despite a multi-billion-dollar marketing effort, many courts consider a properly worded 
package insert to be complete insulation from failure-to-warn liability, if combined with a 
proper entry in the PDR.165 Courts have repeatedly held that where written warnings such 
as the package insert include the condition suffered by the plaintiff, the warnings are suf-
ficient as a matter of law.166 
This focus on the package insert is not helpful in assessing the information actually 
communicated between the pharmaceutical company and the physician because it does not 
take into account the reality of those communications, and the entirety of information that 
is actually viewed and considered by physicians. Although pharmaceutical companies 
must by law provide a package insert with their pharmaceuticals, they give physicians 
information in various other forms, as described above. While the package insert infor-
mation, which also appears in the Physicians’ Desk Reference, may reach physicians and 
alter their prescribing decisions, the promotional information provided by pharmaceutical 
companies is proven to reach physicians, as described above, and is documented to be 
effective in shaping physicians’ prescribing decisions. Focus on the package insert is coun-
ter to the way information about drugs is communicated on the ground. 
While pharmaceutical representatives are highly effective in reaching physicians 
with their marketing information, the same is not true of the package insert. 
The package insert is not user-friendly. As an initial matter, the package insert can 
contain information on many side effects, with little indication of how common they are. 
The package insert can contain an overload of information, rendering it difficult to use.167 
Package inserts have increased in length more than five-fold over the past twenty-five 
years; if printed on 8.5 by 11-inch paper, a package insert for one drug, Cisapride, would 
                                                          
 163. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 164. See, e.g., infra note 165.  
 165. See, e.g., Foister v. Purdue Pharm. L.P., 295 F. Supp. 2d 693, 705-08 (E.D. Ky. 2003); MacPherson v. 
Searle & Co., 775 F. Supp. 417, 425 (D.C. 1991); Weinberger v. Bristol-Myers Co., 652 F. Supp. 187, 190 (D. 
Md. 1986); Dunkin v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121, 124 (W.D. Tenn. 1977); Jacobs v. Dista Prods. Co., 
693 F. Supp. 1029, 1032 (D. Wy. 1988) (granting summary judgment where warning stated potentially “life-
threatening” side effect was reported and indicted the primary cause and management of it); Caveny v. Ciba-
Geigy Corp., 818 F. Supp. 1404, 1405 (D. Colo. 1992) (granting summary judgment where package insert noted 
a “causal relationship [was] probable”). Summary judgment is less likely to be granted where the package insert’s 
language is equivocal or incomplete, but the focus remains on the package insert nonetheless. See, e.g., Thom v. 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 853 (10th Cir. 2003) (reversing summary judgment for defendant where 
package insert’s warnings were equivocal and noting that a package insert’s mere reference to a side effect is not 
necessarily an adequate warning); Williams v. Lederle Labs., 591 F. Supp. 381, 385 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (denying 
summary judgment where package insert did not convey dangers sufficiently, was reluctant in tone, and had no 
sense of urgency); Tongate v. Wyeth Labs., 580 N.E.2d 1220, 1224 (Ill. App. 1990) (denying summary judgment 
where warnings noted only that certain side effects were “reported” and “temporally associated” with the use of 
the drug and that a “causal relationship has not been established”). 
 166. Caveny, 818 F. Supp. at 1404 (holding that package warnings were adequate as a matter of law where the 
warnings named aplastic anemia as a possible side effect and plaintiff died from that side effect; warnings did 
not have to state that medication was to be used only as a last resort); Cather v. Catheter Tech. Corp., 753 F. 
Supp. 634 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (holding that package insert warnings were sufficient as a matter of law where 
warnings included venous thrombosis and embolism, which were the basis of plaintiff’s complaint); Martin v. 
Hacker, 628 N.E.2d 1308 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that a package insert’s warnings were sufficient as a matter of 
law where they warned of the very condition complained of by the plaintiff). 
 167. Raymond L. Woosley, Drug Labeling Revisions—Guaranteed to Fail?, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3047, 
3048 (2000) (“In the last 25 years, the package inserts for new drugs have increased in length more than 5-fold.”). 
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extend to more than ten pages.168 
The package insert is often unread. The package insert often remains unread for 
purely practical reasons.169 Because the package insert is, as the name suggests, provided 
in the pharmaceutical’s packaging, the patient, rather than the physician, receives the pack-
age insert. The physician generally would have no reason to open up a pharmaceutical 
package and read the package insert. The same information that appears in the package 
insert does, however, appear in the Physicians’ Desk Reference book, which exists in both 
print and online versions. However, physicians tend not to sit and read large sections of 
the PDR. Instead, the book is used as a reference guide to be consulted from time to time 
as questions arise.170 Thus, when courts analyze the package insert and focus solely upon 
it, the analysis does not comport with the realities of the package insert and its ability to 
reach physicians. 
The package insert’s tendency to remain unread works in pharmaceutical compa-
nies’ favor because of the causation requirement in a failure-to-warn claim. That is, in 
order to establish a failure-to-warn claim, a plaintiff must satisfy the element of causa-
tion.171 The causation element in a failure-to-warn case requires that the inadequacy or 
absence of a warning must have caused the plaintiff’s injury.172 In most jurisdictions,173 
                                                          
 168. Id. (noting also that the Cisapride package insert contains more than 470 facts about the drug). 
 169. See, e.g., Latiolais v. Merck & Co., 2008 WL 1723162, at *1 (9th Cir. March 3, 2008) (affirming summary 
judgment because “Mr. Davis’s physician testified that he neither read nor relied upon Zocor’s labeling, including 
warnings, in prescribing it for Mr. Davis, and that even if the labeling had a prominent suicide warning he would 
still have prescribed it”); Motus v. Pfizer Inc., 358 F.3d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming summary judgment 
for defendant where physician testified that he had not read Zoloft’s package insert, thereby establishing that the 
adequacy of these warnings was irrelevant); In re Trasylol Prods. Liab. Litig., 2011 WL 2117257, at *5 (S.D. 
Fla. May 23, 2011) (applying Ala. law) (noting “no record evidence indicating that [the prescriber] read the 
warning that Plaintiff claims was inadequate”); Emody v. Medtronic, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1293, 1296 
(N.D. Ala. 2003) (prescriber “did not even read the package insert”); Gebhardt v. Mentor Corp., 15 Fed. App’x. 
540, 542 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying Ariz. law) (“evidence at trial showed that [the prescriber] did not read or rely 
upon the allegedly inadequate warnings of the [defendant’sdefendan’s] device”); Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. 
Rptr.3d 299, 308 318-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“[t]here can be no proximate cause where, as in this case, the 
prescribing physician did not read or rely upon the allegedly inadequate warnings promulgated by a defendant 
about a product”); Lord v. Sigueiros, 2006 WL 1510408, at *3 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. Apr. 26, 2006) (“[pre-
scriber] admits that he had not read the [drug’s] label before prescribing it to the decedent”), aff’d 2007 WL 
4418019, at *4 (Cal App. Dec. 19, 2007) (“[prescriber] testified that he did not read the warning label prior to or 
after prescribing [the drug] to [plaintiff]”); Stanback v. Parke, Davis & Co., 657 F.2d 642, 644 (4th Cir. 1981) 
(“[prescriber] had not read the package insert accompanying the vaccine”); Douglas v. Bussabarger, 438 P.2d 
829, 831 (Wash. 1968) (prescriber “did not read the labeling which was on the container”).  
 170. The Physicians’ Desk Reference is “the most trusted and commonly used drug information reference.” 
PDR, http://www.pdr.net/about-pdr-network/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2013). 
 171. Harris v. McHeil Pharm., 2000 WL 33339657, at *4 (D.N.D. Sept. 5, 2000) (citing Thomas v. Hoffman-
LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 812 (5th Cir. 1992) (“To create a jury question, the evidence must be of sufficient 
weight to establish, by the preponderance of the evidence, at least some reasonable likelihood that an adequate 
warning would have prevented the plaintiff from receiving the drug.”). 
 172. Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 812 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Miss. law) (stating that 
“to create a jury question, the evidence introduced must be of sufficient weight to establish, by the preponderance 
of the evidence, at least some reasonable likelihood that an adequate warning would have prevented the plaintiff 
from receiving the drug”); Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 984, 991 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“A plaintiff asserting 
causes of action based on a failure-to-warn must prove not only that no warning was provided or the warning 
was inadequate, but also that the inadequacy or absence of the warning caused the plaintiff’s injury.”); Mazur v. 
Merck & Co., 742 F. Supp. 239, 262 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (noting that “[i]n the duty to warn context, assuming that 
plaintiffs have established both duty and failure-to-warn, plaintiffs must further establish proximate causation by 
showing that had defendant issued a proper warning to the learned intermediary, he would have altered his be-
havior and the injury would have been avoided.”). 
 173. Thomas, 949 F.2d at 814 (noting that in some jurisdictions, a “heeding presumption” applies. This is a 
presumption that if an appropriate warning had been given, it would have been heeded. “Heeding” does not 
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the causation element requires that the plaintiff’s physician must have actually read the 
inadequate warning.174 The reasoning for this requirement is that if the physician did not 
read the warnings at all, a more suitable or adequate warning likewise would not have been 
read. An improved warning, therefore, would not have made any difference to the out-
come, and its absence is not actionable.175 
This outcome would make sense if the package insert were in fact the only infor-
mation on safety and side effects that the pharmaceutical companies promulgate. That, as 
described above, is not the case.176 In addition to the package insert, pharmaceutical com-
panies promulgate a host of other statements regarding safety through their representatives 
and marketing materials. If, in keeping with this reality, the term “reasonable warning” 
were understood to consist of the package insert together with the pharmaceutical com-
pany’s marketing statements regarding side effects and safety as well, then this causation 
element would be less likely to bar plaintiffs with failure-to-warn claims from reaching a 
jury. 
In one case, for example, a physician testified that he had not read the Zoloft package 
insert; the court granted summary judgment, reasoning that proper warnings would have 
also remained unread.177 The physician, though, had learned about Zoloft from Pfizer rep-
resentatives, who recommended prescribing Zoloft for depression and panic attacks.178 The 
representatives did not tell the physician about the relevant side effects of Zoloft, namely 
the increased risk of suicide.179 As to many of the meetings with drug representatives, the 
physician could not remember exactly what was said or what was given to him, although 
the drug that he prescribed was a Pfizer sample.180 This example shows in sharp relief why 
a focus on the package insert makes little sense—marketing information is devoid of any 
record, yet is reaching physicians. The package insert is a clear record and does not reach 
                                                          
necessarily mean that a drug would not have been given, only that the prescriber would have “incorporated the 
‘additional’ risk into [the] decisional calculus”). Id. at 813 (using the drug may still be the less risky course of 
conduct); see also Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154 163 (4th Cir. 1999). Thus, the heeding presumption 
is defeated if the physician testifies that communication of the enhanced warning would not have made a differ-
ence in the decision to prescribe. See Stanbeck, 256 F.3d at 1024 (affirming summary judgment for pharmaceu-
tical company defendant where physician testified that she had independent knowledge of the allegedly absent 
warning and would have prescribed the drug even if given the additional warning information by the pharmaceu-
tical company). 
 174. See, e.g., Tucker v. Wright Med. Tech., Inc., 2013 WL 1149717, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2013) (grant-
ing summary judgment for medical device defendant and finding inadequacy of warnings irrelevant where phy-
sician did not read warnings). 
 175. Tucker, 2013 WL 1149717, at *16. 
 176. See supra Part I.   
 177. Motus, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 987.  
 178. Id. at 988.   
 179. Id. (noting that representatives did not tell the prescriber that Zoloft “could (1) cause akathisia; (2) worsen 
a patient’s situation; (3) cause a patient to have suicidal thoughts; (4) cause a patient to experience a feeling so 
acute that death is a welcome result; or (5) increase the risk that a patient would commit suicide”); see also Lord 
v. Sigueiros, 2006 WL 1510408, at *3-4 (Cal. App Dep’t Super. Ct. April 26, 2006) (“[prescriber] admit[ted] 
that he had not read the [drug’s] label before prescribing it to the decedent”; prescriber had heard information 
from pharmaceutical representatives but could not remember the substance of any discussions; overpromotion 
claim rejected), aff’d 2007 WL 4418019, at *4 (Cal App. Ct. Dec. 19, 2007) (“[prescriber] testified that he did 
not read the warning label prior to or after prescribing [the drug] to [plaintiff]”); Patterson v. AstraZeneca, LP, 
876 F. Supp. 2d 27, 36 (D.D.C. 2012) (noting that the physician could not remember any substantive information 
from any of the pharmaceutical representatives’ thirty-one visits and concluding that the visits therefore had 
“little to no impact” on the physician). 
 180. Motus, 196 F. Supp. at 986. 
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physicians, yet its mere existence is decisive in many failure-to-warn cases. 
 2. Information about Pharmaceuticals is Dynamic While the Package Insert is 
Slow to Change 
The package insert and the reality of a company’s knowledge of side effects can be 
significantly out of step, with the warnings stating one position while the pharmaceutical 
representatives state another. This means that the reasonableness of the warning cannot be 
assessed without looking beyond the package insert. 
Pharmaceutical companies must revise labeling as soon as there is “reasonable evi-
dence” of a new, serious danger—a causal relationship need not have been proven.181 Even 
when the updating process works as intended, the process can be laborious. In the case of 
Vioxx, for example, the company pursued an aggressive marketing campaign despite its 
knowledge of a link between Vioxx and an increased risk of heart attacks.182 The evidence 
in litigation of failure-to-warn and other cases showed that Merck went to considerable 
lengths to avoid changing the package insert to include new warning information about 
cardiac risks, even though the risks were well known at the time.183 The evidence at trial 
showed that Merck was aware of the cardiac risks even when Vioxx was first approved.184 
The FDA called for further testing, but Merck did not do the testing right away. The 
company instead completed a large study known as the “VIGOR” study, which was per-
formed on people with rheumatoid arthritis, with the goal of expanding the market for 
Vioxx. The study in fact confirmed the increased cardio-vascular risks. When Merck 
sought the new indication for Vioxx, Merck “sought to dilute the labeling required as a 
result of [its] VIGOR study” and “engaged in strenuous efforts to ensure that the results 
of the VIGOR study were not communicated to prescribing physicians by sales per-
sons.”185 When the FDA was finally made aware of definitive evidence of increased risks, 
it took over two years for the labeling changes to occur.186 The package insert, the com-
pany’s knowledge about the risks, and the message that the company is promoting about 
the risks can differ from one another significantly. For this reason, in a failure-to-warn 
case, the package insert is just one example of the information the company is receiving, 
and the package insert likely does not reflect the company’s complete knowledge at that 
time, or the message that pharmaceutical representatives are communicating on the 
ground. 
 3. While the Package Insert is Easily Available, Marketing Information is 
Often Unavailable as  Evidence 
The package insert is an appealing piece of evidence because it is readily available 
and its content is clear—other information may be unavailable. Pharmaceutical represent-
atives’ statements to physicians, for example, are often not available as evidence. These 
                                                          
 181. 21 C.F.R. §201.57(c) (“The labeling shall be revised to include a warning as soon as there is reasonable 
evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a drug; a causal relationship need not have been proved.”). 
 182. McDarby v. Merck, 949 A.2d 223, 256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008). 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 259. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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statements regarding warnings are most often made in private, are generally undocu-
mented, and, therefore, can rarely be produced in litigation. Even those made at presenta-
tions or during physician events may not be documented. In a few celebrated cases, train-
ing materials have slipped out, resulting in shock and amazement at companies’ directives 
to their pharmaceutical representatives.187 
Often, faulty memory and an absence of documentation are the culprits. In fact, a 
brief review of published cases revealed case after case in which the package insert is in 
evidence, but parties to the conversation between pharmaceutical representative and phy-
sician cannot be remembered.188 In these cases, the court may have considered the effect 
of pharmaceutical representatives’ statements to physicians, but the court was unable to 
do so, given their unavailability. Courts are left, therefore, with the clear evidence of the 
package insert, which is often not read, and shadowy statements by pharmaceutical repre-
sentatives, which are effective but undocumented. Under these circumstances, pharmaceu-
tical cases tend not to even reach a jury. 
 4.  Exclusive Focus on the Package Insert Elevates the Regulations to De 
Facto Preemptive Status 
The statutes governing FDA actions do not state that they preempt state failure-to-
warn law, nor does the Restatement (Third) of Torts require that courts focus solely on the 
package insert when assessing warning information. To be sure, the FDA has at times 
pushed for such preemption in a marked departure from its previous stance on the issue.189 
Its efforts to date, however, have been rebuffed in the courts.190 When courts considering 
failure-to-warn cases consider the package insert as sole and sufficient to amount to a 
“reasonable warning,” courts are effectively deciding the preemption issue and according 
de facto preemptive status to the FDA regulations. 
While a complete discussion of the merits of FDA preemption is beyond the scope 
of this article, suffice it to say that FDA regulation and the tort liability scheme serve two 
very different functions. The regulatory scheme developed by the FDA attempts to ensure 
safety by examining data about clinical trials performed by pharmaceutical companies, 
reviewing New Drug Applications by companies seeking to sell new pharmaceuticals, and 
requiring a detailed package insert for each pharmaceutical. The FDA’s efforts, therefore, 
                                                          
 187. See supra Part I.B. 
 188. See, e.g., Prather v. Abbott Labs., 960 F. Supp. 2d 700, 716 (W.D. Ky. 2013) (noting in a medical device 
products liability lawsuit that the physician could not recall whether the representative explained how to use the 
medical device in question); Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 848 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1338  (W.D. Okla. 2012) (noting, 
in a fraudulent misrepresentation lawsuit against a pharmaceutical company, that the physician “did not recall” 
receiving any specific information about the pharmaceutical in question); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 
F. Supp. 2d 230, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (describing physician’s testimony that he did not recall whether a phar-
maceutical representative gave him warnings information about the weight gain associated with the drug 
Zyprexa). 
 189. David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA’s Efforts to Preempt Failure-
to-Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461, 463 (2008) (noting that “[t]he past few years have been marked by a seismic 
shift in FDA policy. The agency now maintains that state-law failure-to-warn cases threaten its ability to protect 
the public health. According to the agency, a determination in civil litigation that an FDA-approved label fails 
adequately to warn of risks may force manufacturers to add warnings that are not approved by the FDA, thus 
rendering the product ‘misbranded’”). 
 190. See generally Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2013).  
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are largely forward-looking. In addition, the FDA regulations can be seen as setting mini-
mum standards.191 
The toxic tort liability system, however, takes into evidence how the regulations set 
out by the FDA are actually followed in an individual case. In addition, tort law compen-
sates those who are affected when the regulations do not work or when companies flout 
the rules. 
 A growing movement, represented by some state laws and, at one point, FDA’s 
commentary on its regulations, urges a rebuttable presumption that a package insert com-
pliant with FDA regulations preempts liability for failure-to-warn.192 This movement, 
however, is still just that.193 The New Jersey Supreme Court stated, for example, that com-
pliance with FDA marketing and labeling specifications should mean “pharmaceutical 
manufacturers should not have to confront state tort liability premised on theories of design 
defect or warning inadequacy.”194 Compliance with all marketing requirements is ex-
tremely difficult to establish, however, so this approach quickly devolves into an exclusive 
focus on the label, as it did in the Perez case: Thus, “[a]ny duty to warn physicians about 
prescription drug dangers is presumptively met by compliance with federal labeling.”195 
While the court noted that the presumption was not absolute, it allowed the presumption 
to be overcome only in the case of the manufacturer’s “deliberate concealment . . . of after-
acquired knowledge of harmful effects . . . .”196 Courts applying this standard have limited 
its application, noting that the FDA has a limited ability to find unforeseen post-approval 
side effects and that its oversight is flawed.197 
Other courts have held that a package insert complying with FDA regulations is 
sufficient as a matter of law.198 This approach, however, makes the FDA regulatory process 
presumptively preemptive of the court’s full analysis in a failure-to-warn case. Preemption 
is not currently the law, and it should not become the law in a back-door manner through 
                                                          
 191. Rite Aid Corp. v. Levy-Gray, 876 A.2d 115, 132 (Md. App. 2005) (citing Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666 
F. Supp. 1483, 1491 (D. Kan. 1987) (“FDA regulations of prescription drugs are generally viewed as setting min-
imum standards, both as to design and warning.”). 
 192. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (“If the warning or instruction given in connection with a drug or device or 
food or food additive has been approved or prescribed by the federal Food and Drug Administration under the 
‘Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,’ 21 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. or the ‘Public Health Service Act,’42 U.S.C. § 
201 et seq., a rebuttable presumption shall arise that the warning or instruction is adequate.”).  
 193. The FDA stated in a preamble to a 2006 rule meant to revise drug labeling requirements that 
“FDA approval of labeling . . . preempts conflicting or contrary State law.” 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934-35 (2006).  
 194. Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1257 (N.J. 1999).  
 195. Id. at 1259. 
 196. Id. 
 197. McDarby v. Merck, 949 A.2d 223, 256-57 (N.J. 2008).  
[S]crutiny disclosed flaws in the regulatory system, existing at least until the time of the 
2007 Amendments, that render the dictum of Perez less all-encompassing than it might 
then have appeared. Commentators and courts have since recognized that, whereas pre-
market approvals of drugs are generally thorough in nature, the ability of the FDA, post-
market, ‘to detect unforeseen adverse effects of [a] drug and to take prompt and effective 
remedial action’ is considerably less . . . . It is these flaws in that post-marketing oversight 
process that provide the foundation for the further exception to the presumption of ade-
quacy that we find applicable to this case. 
Id.  
 198. Hurley v. Lederle Labs., 863 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1988) (explaining that the FDA extensively reviews the 
warnings and information from the pharmaceutical company and that when the FDA approves the warning, the 
company must use that exact warning; to require another warning under state law would conflict with the FDA). 
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a narrow focus on the package insert. 
C.  The “Overpromotion” Exception to the Learned Intermediary Defense is 
Inadequate, Because the Bar is Impossibly High 
Occasionally, direct and clear evidence of pharmaceutical representatives’ down-
playing of warnings is available as evidence. In these situations, courts are sometimes re-
ceptive to the argument that warnings can hardly function as such when they are being 
undermined by intense marketing efforts. Indeed, for decades, some courts have suspected 
the influence of marking efforts on physicians’ decision-making and have therefore shown 
willingness to consider pharmaceutical representatives’ statements as part of a failure-to-
warn case. 
The seeds of a claim for negligent overpromotion of a drug or chemical appeared in 
a 1974 North Carolina case in which a child died of aplastic anemia after receiving a drug 
prescribed by her physician.199 The subsequent lawsuit claimed that the drug company im-
properly marketed the drug, overpromoted the drug to physicians, and did not provide 
physicians with proper warnings.200 Reversing summary judgment for the defendant, the 
court explained that simply following the letter of the law could be an insufficient shield 
against liability if the drug had been overpromoted.201 A California court denied summary 
judgment, likewise agreeing that overpromotion of a drug could have overcome the pack-
age insert’s warnings of the blood dyscrasia with certain uses of the drug; the pharmaceu-
tical company had provided calendars and other gifts, such that physicians could have been 
influenced to prescribe the drug where they might not otherwise have done so.202 
More recently, a federal district court in Ohio agreed that overpromotion could nul-
lify even otherwise sufficient warnings.203 A New York court agreed that “[i]n unusual 
cases, courts have found a drug manufacturer’s excessive promotion of its product may 
negate or call into question operation of the learned intermediary doctrine.”204 
To establish this exception to the learned intermediary defense, courts currently re-
quire a showing “that such overpromotion caused the physician to initiate or maintain the 
prescription at issue. General claims of overpromotion are not sufficient.”205 Only in rare 
                                                          
 199. Whitely v. Cubberly, 210 S.E.2d 289 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974). 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 292 (noting “that Parke, Davis may have fully complied with all applicable Federal laws in its 
marketing and labeling Chloromycetin would not in itself free it of liability for harm caused by use of the drug 
if it were shown that such use and resulting harm was caused by the company’s negligent acts in overpromoting 
the drug, the dangerous properties of which it was aware or in the exercise of due care should have been aware.”).  
 202. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653 (Cal. 1973). 
 203. In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F. Supp. 2d 791, 814 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (granting summary judg-
ment for defendant pharmaceutical manufacturers but noting that “[h]ad they come forth with evidence that using 
Meridia poses substantial risks of harm ,then their claims that overpromotion nullified the defendants’ workings 
might have been sufficient. Given the paucity of evidence that Meridia is harmful, however, the Court must reject 
this claim.”). 
 204. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 2009 WL 2004540, at *14 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2009); see also Dean v. 
Eli Lilly & Co., 387 Fed. App’x. 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 
1377 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (noting that with this exception “overpromotion of a product negates any warnings . . . 
such that a manufacturer of the product cannot avail itself of the doctrine”). 
 205. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 649 F. Supp. 2d 18, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 2009). “In order to defeat a motion 
for summary judgment, an assertion of overpromotion must be well-supported factually.” In re Zyprexa Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 268 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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cases, however, is the overpromotion exception successful.206 
The exception is difficult to establish in part because the evidence is so hard to find. 
Unlike the package insert, which is memorialized and easily accessible, evidence of over-
promotion or watering down occurs in private conversations or at social events, which are 
difficult, if not impossible to reconstruct and bring into court. Again and again, courts 
reject an overpromotion claim due to lack of any concrete evidence: 
 
 Where a pharmaceutical representative visited a physician thirty-one 
times, the physician prescribed the medication in question and then failed 
to recognize a warned-of side-effect in the patient, there was no “concrete 
evidence” of overpromotion . The court required—but could not find—
“a link between these visits and misinformation that would make the prior 
warnings ineffective.”207 
 
 Despite a “vigorous sales campaign” aimed at the physician in question, 
the was “no evidence that [the manufacturer’s] sales people either misled 
[the physician] about the link between Zypreza and diabetes or caused 
[the physician] to prescribe Zyprexa to [plaintiff]”208 
 
 Summary judgment for defendants where plaintiff did not show that “Bi-
omet’s marketing materials [] induce[d] him to inappropriately select pa-
tients for the device.”209 Marketing “included sales visits to surgeons, ad-
vertisements in orthopedic journals, presentations at meetings of 
orthopedic surgeons, video demonstrations and literature about the prod-
uct. Biomet also sponsored articles written about its product.”210 
 
The overpromotion exception shows that courts are cognizant of pharmaceutical market-
ing’s realities—that is, that alongside the printed warnings there exists a far more compel-
ling universe of marketing materials and presentations that can effectively undo the very 
warnings that were given. In addition, studies establish that the marketing often drives the 
decision to prescribe.211 
But the overpromotion exception has proven ineffective to take account of these 
anti-warnings because it requires a showing that is all but impossible for plaintiffs to pro-
vide. Courts apply the following standard, based on the marketing’s actually causing the 
                                                          
 206. Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206 (Pa. 1971) (holding that evidence that a sales force has “minimized 
the dangers of [a] drug while emphasizing its effectiveness, wide acceptance and use, and lack of certain objec-
tionable side effects associated with other drugs” was sufficient to suggest that the “printed words of warning 
were in effect cancelled out and rendered meaningless”).  
 207. Patteson v. AstraZeneca, LP, 876 F. Supp. 2d 27, 36 (D.D.C. 2012). Contra Holley v. Burroughs Well-
come Co., 348 S.E.2d 772 (N.C. 1986) (noting that plaintiff’s overpromotion claim had support sufficient to 
defeat defendant’s motion for summary judgment).  
 208. Dean v. Eli Lilly & Co., 387 Fed. App’x. 28, 30 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 209. Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1377-78 (S.D. Fla. 2007). 
 210. Id. at 1363. 
 211. See supra Part I.    
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prescribing decision: “That such overpromotion caused the physician to initiate or main-
tain the prescription at issue. General claims of overpromotion are not sufficient.”212 That 
is, the overpromotion exception usually proceeds in two steps—first, the analysis of the 
warning and a finding that it meets the “reasonableness” standard, and then, in a distinct 
and separate step, whether the alleged overpromotion caused the physician to prescribe the 
drug in question.213 
As a practical matter, this standard is all but impossible to meet. Recall that even 
physicians themselves do not believe pharmaceutical representatives have an effect on 
their decision-making, even though empirical studies show that they do.214 The evidence 
that courts require could consist of a physician testifying that when he or she received a 
pharmaceutical company stipend or attended a dinner, his or her professional judgment 
was affected. A physician could testify that he or she had responded to a pharmaceutical 
representative’s request that his or her “next four” prescriptions be for that representative’s 
products, as pharmaceutical representatives are known to have requested.215 Such testi-
mony, however, is difficult to imagine and would surely be rare at best. Perhaps for these 
reasons, the overpromotion exception has failed repeatedly to the point that it is generally 
an empty gesture. The overpromotion exception is inadequate to address the vigorous mar-
keting that has become routine in the pharmaceutical industry. 
A physician’s decision-making with regard to warnings is therefore affected by 
warning-related information from a number of sources, not just the package insert. Be-
cause the physician’s judgment is based on the package insert plus assurances from phar-
maceutical representatives, these other statements and assurances from pharmaceutical 
representatives should be included in the warnings as part of a failure-to-warn case. 
IV. TOTAL MIX: THE FAILURE-TO-WARN ANALYSIS SHOULD CONSIDER ALL OF THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANY’S WARNING AND WARNING-DILUTING INFORMATION 
When pharmaceutical marketing is recognized for what it is—a significant yet sur-
reptitious factor in many prescribing decisions—the failure-to-warn analysis must change 
accordingly, in at least the following three ways, described in more detail below: (1) in 
analyzing the reasonableness of a warning, courts should not consider the package insert 
in isolation; courts should consider all of the pharmaceutical company’s warning or warn-
ing-diluting statements that reach physicians through pharmaceutical marketing; (2) in the 
causation analysis, a physician’s failure to read the package insert should not, alone, be 
sufficient to defeat causation; (3) finally, research demonstrates that social psychology 
operates at a subconscious level, so a physician’s own statement that pharmaceutical mar-
keting did not affect the prescribing decision should not be conclusive—a jury should be 
able to decide for itself the effect of pharmaceutical marketing in a particular case. 
A.  Courts Analyzing the Reasonableness of a Warning Should Consider the Full 
Spectrum of Warning and Anti-Warning Information that Reaches Physicians—Not 
                                                          
 212. In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 489 F. Supp. 2d at 268. 
 213. See supra notes 207-98. 
 214. See supra Part I. 
 215. See supra Part I.  
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Just the Package  Insert 
As explained above, the package insert has become the go-to piece of information 
in a pharmaceutical failure-to-warn case, often serving as the beginning and end of the 
warnings analysis.216 But consideration of all the warnings information would be in har-
mony with criteria that have been used by various courts in the past. A reasonableness 
analysis has included the following factors, although courts have often focused on partic-
ular factors to the exclusion of others or ignored them entirely in favor of the package 
insert: (1) the warning must state the significant risks involved and be factually correct217; 
(2) the warning must have the physical attributes such that a reasonably prudent person 
would be alerted to the dangers; (3) the warning must communicate the seriousness of the 
harm that may result; (4) the warning cannot be ambiguous, equivocal, or contradictory;218 
(5) the warning should be easily understood by the intended audience; and (6) the warning 
should be communicated by the most appropriate means.219 The mere mention of a possible 
injury or side effect may not be adequate.220 
Information from pharmaceutical representatives that downplays or contradicts writ-
ten warnings would fall afoul of factor number four, the requirement that the warnings be 
unequivocal. That is, even if the package insert does state the warnings information, that 
information is undercut by contradictory information provided by pharmaceutical repre-
sentatives. 
Instead of a weak “overpromotion” exception, therefore, today’s pharmaceutical 
marketing requires that courts instead consider marketing materials and statements in the 
first instance. That is, the marketing statements made to physicians should be considered 
alongside the warning language, to see whether the warning is “reasonable” in its entirety. 
The information would be placed together with the warning information that pharmaceu-
tical companies provide to physicians: both warnings and warning-diluting information 
                                                          
 216. Supra note 165. 
 217. See Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1320 (5th Cir. 1985); Deines v. Vermeer Mfg. 
Co., 755 F. Supp. 350, 353 (D. Kan. 1990) (“The manufacturer’s duty is to warn of all potential dangers which 
it knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, to exist.”); In re Meridia, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 
812  (citing Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tenn. 1994) (holding that a pharmaceutical company’s 
warning to physicians is adequate if it “contain[s] a full and complete disclosure of the potential adverse reactions 
to the drug”); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831 (Ohio 1981) (“A warning is adequate . . . where, under 
all the circumstances, it reasonably discloses to the medical profession all risks inherent in the use of the drug 
which the manufacturer knew or should have known to exist.”). 
 218. See, e.g., Salmon v. Park, Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359 at 1363 (4th Cir. 2012) (statement expressing 
doubt about causal connection between chloramphenicol and aplastic anemia diluted a disclosure stating the need 
to take precautions against anemia); Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345 (5th Cir. 1977) (a warning for an 
oral polio vaccine was potentially inadequate where it stated the risk of paralysis as one is three million but then 
cast doubt on the causal link between the vaccine and the paralysis). As explained in further detail in Part III.B, 
a warning may also be diluted by subsequent advertising and promotional activities which downplays the prod-
uct’s risks. See Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 662 (Cal. 1973) (warning provided to physicians 
by drug company about the risk of aplastic anemia from administration of Chloromycetin antibiotic to patients 
was nullified by subsequent overpromotion); Incolligo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 220 (Pa. 1971) (warning pro-
vided to physicians by drug company about the risk of aplastic anemia from administration of Chloromycetin 
antibiotic to patients was nullified by subsequent overpromotion). 
 219. Id. 
 220. In re Meridia, 328 F. Supp. 2d at 812 (citing Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 267 (5th Cir. 
2002)).   
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should be considered as part of the “reasonable warning” analysis cited in the Restate-
ment.221 
One practical result of this analysis would be that a greater number of claims survive 
summary judgment and potentially reach a jury. If a court considers the package insert 
alone, the result is often summary judgment for the defendant.222 This is because an unam-
biguous warning is considered a question of law for the court to decide.223 The package 
insert, considered alone, often states every possible side effect and gives all the warning 
information, so considered in isolation, it is often an unambiguous warning. Consideration 
of contradictory evidence concerning warnings, such as some of the information from 
pharmaceutical representatives, could well render the warning ambiguous—an ambiguous 
or contradictory warning is a question of fact suitable for a jury to decide.224 Summary 
judgment on a warning’s adequacy is not appropriate where the warning does not convey 
“a fair indication of the nature of the dangers involved, was reluctant and equivocal in 
tone, and lacked a sense of urgency.”225 
The consideration of pharmaceutical marketing information as part of the warnings 
will no doubt be met with some criticism. It could be argued, for example, that physicians 
are held to a professional standard of care that calls for them to be aware of the proper 
instructions for medications they prescribe, and that they should therefore read the package 
insert regardless of any marketing.226 Arguably, they should be capable of reading and 
digesting a package insert and ignoring all other information that might dilute or otherwise 
neutralize the package insert’s warnings. While physicians are, of course, charged with 
following the standard of care, such an argument improperly merges a failure-to-warn 
claim with a malpractice claim. That is, the time to analyze a physician’s adherence to the 
standard of care is when the physician’s actions towards the patient are at issue. In a fail-
ure-to-warn claim, however, the pharmaceutical company’s actions are at issue and the 
focus should remain on those actions. In addition, to assume that physicians focus only on 
the package insert is to ignore the documented effects of pharmaceutical marketing. 
Furthermore, this approach could result in higher settlements for plaintiffs and po-
tentially increase judgments against pharmaceutical companies because additional cases 
                                                          
 221. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6(d) (1998). 
 222. See supra Part III.B. 
 223. See, e.g., Tongate v. Wyeth Labs,, 580 N.E.2d 1220, 1224 (Ill. App. 1991) (“[T]he adequacy of warnings 
is a question of fact, not law, for the jury to determine . . . .”); Martin v. Hacker, 628 N.E.2d 1308 (N.Y. 1993) 
(“In determining whether a warning is adequate as a matter of law or presents a question of fact for the jury, New 
York courts ‘evaluate the [warning]’s language for its accuracy, clarity and relative consistency.’ The sufficiency 
of the warning can become a question of law where the warning is clear, accurate and unambiguous”); Hernandez 
v. Schering Corp., 958 N.E.2d 447, 455 (Ill. App. 2011) (citing Upjohn Co. v. MacMurdo, 562 So.2d 680 (Fla. 
1990)); Kelso v. Bayer Corp., 398 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2005) (applying Ill. law). 
 224. See, e.g., Tongate, 580 N.E.2d at 1220.   
 225. Michael Imbroscio, Adequate Warnings in the Face of Uncertain Causality: The Learned Intermediary 
Doctrine and the Need for Clarity, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 847, 852 (2005) (quoting Williams v. Lederle Labs., 592 
F. Supp. 381, 385 (S.D. Ohio 1984)). 
 226. The FDA approved labeling is often used to establish a standard of care for correct use of a medication, 
either with or without expert testimony. Bill Vaslas & Neil Schreffler, The Role of FDA-Approved Labeling in 
Medical Malpractice Litigation, PDR NETWORK, available at http://www.pdrnetwork.com/docs/default-
source/educational-materials/novdec2010_22-26vaslas_schreffler.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (last visited August 29, 2013) 
(noting approaches by which the FDA Labeling is recognized as prima facie evidence of the standard of care 
sufficient for submission to a jury—the “Mulder rule”—as opposed to other approaches by which the FDA La-
beling must be accompanied by expert testimony to establish the standard of care). 
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would survive summary judgment. Some would argue that this could result in increased 
costs of pharmaceuticals for patients, and that the approach proposed in this article there-
fore should not be adopted.227 Costs of pharmaceutical litigation are already significant.228 
Nevertheless, litigation serves an important function, given that the FDA cannot detect and 
prevent every safety-related problem.229 Indeed, some commentators argue that the pendu-
lum has swung too far toward the criticism of litigation’s “over-deterrent” influence, such 
that legislation, case law, and scholarship have turned away from the idea that products 
liability improves consumer welfare. 
To dissuade pharmaceutical representatives from undercutting written warnings, all 
the information that doctors receive should be considered. A “warning” cannot be effective 
if it is undercut by additional information and assurances—from the same pharmaceutical 
company source as the package insert—that attempt to discount legitimate fears or neu-
tralize otherwise effective warnings. 
B.  In the Causation Analysis, a Physician’s Failure to Read the Package Insert Alone 
Should  not be Sufficient to Defeat Causation 
 As explained above,230 where a physician does not read a package insert, courts 
frequently grant summary judgment, reasoning that if the physician did not read the extant 
warnings, additional or stronger warnings would not have made any difference because 
the physician would not have read those either.231 
The problem with this analysis is that it does not take into account the surreptitious 
effects of pharmaceutical marketing. That is, where the physician has been the target of a 
marketing campaign regarding the drug at issue, summary judgment is inappropriate be-
cause research shows that when pharmaceutical marketing targets physicians, the market-
ing dilutes warnings in the package insert (which tends not to be read anyway) and replaces 
those FDA-vetted warnings with statements that either downplay the warnings or eliminate 
them completely.232 As explained above, targeted physicians tend to select the marketed 
drug both when it is indicated in the warning and when it is not.233 
Thus, before concluding that a physician took in no warning information, based 
purely on an unread package insert (and hence that better warnings would have made no 
                                                          
 227. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 99, at 165-66 (discussing various disadvantages to litigation over approved 
drugs and warnings but assuming that the warning is composed only of the official warning).  
 228. See, e.g., David G. Owen, Dangers in Prescription Drugs: Filling a Private Law Gap in the Healthcare 
Debate, 42 CONN. L. REV. 733, 737 (2010) (noting the cost of pharmaceutical litigation, including settlements 
involving drugs such as Vioxx—settlement of 50,000 cases for $4.85 billion— and Zyprexa —$1.415 billion in 
civil and criminal penalties). 
 229. Anita Bernstein, Enhancing Drug Effectiveness & Efficacy Through Personal Injury Litigation, 15 J. L. 
POL’Y 1051, 1098-99 (2007).  
 230. See supra Part III.B. 
 231. Motus, v. Pfizer, 358 F.3d 659, 661 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming district court’s grant of summary judgment 
because the prescribing physician “did not read the warning label that accompanied Zoloft or rely on information 
provided by Pfizer’s detail men before prescribing the drug to Mr. Motus . . . .”). 
 232. See, e.g., Barbara Mintzes, PhD, et al., Pharmaceutical Sales Representatives and Patient Safety: A Com-
parative Prospective Study of Information Quality in Canada, France, and the United States, Health Policy, 
28(10) J. GEN. INTERN. MED.1368, 1373 (2013) (noting that in all three countries studied, pharmaceutical repre-
sentatives rarely informed physicians about serious adverse events and observing a “serious lack of information” 
in pharmaceutical representative discussions about medications). 
 233. Sah & Fugh-Berman, supra note 25. 
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difference), the court should determine whether the physician was exposed to marketing 
information on the drug in question. Marketing information is proven to move the deci-
sion-making needle when it reaches physicians, whether physicians realize it or not.234 
C.  Social Psychology-Based Marketing Operates at a  Subconscious Level, so a 
Physician’s Own Statement on its Effects Should not be Conclusive as to the 
Causation Element 
Finally, research demonstrates that social psychology operates at a subconscious 
level, so a physician’s own statement that pharmaceutical marketing did not affect the 
prescribing decision should not be conclusive—a jury should be able to decide the effect 
of pharmaceutical marketing in each case. 
Marketing techniques based on social psychology operate at a subconscious level, 
so the targeted person is not the best judge of the techniques’ effectiveness.235 Indeed, 
physicians themselves have been demonstrated not to be the best judges of whether their 
decision-making was affected by pharmaceutical marketing.236 The empirical research 
cited above indicates that physicians are affected by marketing, even though they are often 
confident that they are not affected.237 In addition, they assessed marketing materials as 
accurate and sufficient to serve as the basis for a decision to prescribe, even when warnings 
were left out.238 
When a physician testifies that he or she was not affected by pharmaceutical mar-
keting and that proper warnings would have made no difference, some courts have granted 
summary judgment for the defendant pharmaceutical company, based on the absence of 
causation.239 That is, the summary judgment can be based purely on the physician’s own 
statement of what he or she would have done if the warning had been different.240 If the 
physician testifies that he or she would have made the same decision to prescribe regard-
less of a different or better warning, then arguably the pharmaceutical company’s failure 
to give a proper warning did not affect the decision to prescribe. 
But a different outcome can—and should—result when there is reason to question 
the physician-witness’s assessment. That is, when there is reason to question the conclu-
                                                          
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See supra Part I.C. 
 238. Mintzes, supra note 232, at 1373 (noting that “[d]espite these omissions [of safety information], physi-
cians judged information quality positively and expressed willingness to increase prescribing nearly two-thirds 
of the time.”). 
 239. See, e.g., Motus v. Pfizer, 196 F. Supp. 2d 984, 997-98 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (basing summary judgment on 
physician’s testimony that he met with pharmaceutical representatives and attended pharmaceutical company 
seminars but was not affected by any pharmaceutical company statements or materials); Stanback v. Parke, Davis 
& Co., 657 F.2d 642, 644-45 (4th Cir. 1981) (applying Va. law and granting summary judgment when physician 
testified that adequate warnings would not have changed a prescribing decision); Plummer v. Lederle Labs., 819 
F.2d 349, 358 (2d Cir. 1987) (applying Cal. law); Windham v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 786 F. Supp. 607, 612 (S.D. 
Miss 1992) (applying Miss. law); Strumph v. Schering Corp.,, 626 A.2d 1090 (N.J. 1993) (applying N.J. law); 
Thomas v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 949 F.2d 806, 817 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying Miss. law). 
 240. Supra note 239.  
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siveness of a physician’s after-the-fact assessment of what might have happened if a the-
oretical, more complete warning had been given.241 Even without focusing on the surrep-
titious effects of pharmaceutical marketing, some courts have declined to grant summary 
judgment on causation where the physician testifies that a proper warning would not have 
made a difference in the decision to prescribe.242 This issue, those courts explain, should 
present a jury question.243 
Research shows that pharmaceutical marketing affects physicians, encouraging 
them to prefer certain medications over others and even prescribe when a medication is 
not indicated.244 At the same time, the marketing is based on principles of social psychol-
ogy, so that the targeted person is the least likely to realize the marketing’s effects.245 So, 
when there is evidence that the physician was the target of pharmaceutical marketing of 
the medication at issue, the jury should have the opportunity to decide how the marketing 
affected the physician’s judgment and whether the marketing made a difference in the 
particular case. After all, the causation question concerns actual causation, rather than just 
one person’s opinion of whether or not he or she was persuaded, particularly where re-
search indicates the person may not be the most reliable judge of whether the persuasion 
was effective. 
The assessment of causation should take into account the pervasive reach of phar-
maceutical marketing, and the fact that by its very nature, pharmaceutical marketing skews 
the judgment of those it targets. A physician’s judgment of what his or her decision would 
have been if faced, in the past, with a more complete warning, should not result in sum-
mary judgment. An outside party—the jury—should be able to determine the answer to 
that causation question. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Pharmaceutical representatives’ marketing to physicians is proven to affect physi-
cian decision-making, even without physicians realizing the effect. The analysis of a warn-
ing’s reasonableness in the context of a failure-to-warn case should recognize the power 
of this marketing and that the package insert is not the only warnings-related information 
reaching physicians. Indeed, the loud and persistent marketing campaigns often drown out 
the scientific evidence, and result in the prescribing of medications that may not be appro-
priate for the patient, may not be the most cost-effective option, or may be downright 
                                                          
 241. Doe v. Miles Labs., Inc., 927 F.2d 187, 195 n.32 (4th Cir. 1991) (applying Md. law and noting that 
although physician testified that she would have administered the drug in question even with full knowledge of 
the associated AIDS risk, this “hindsight opinion [was] not conclusive of what she would have done had she been 
invested with all pertinent facts regarding [the medication]. Thus, the causation issue . . . presents a genuine issue 
of material fact”); Williams v. Lederle Labs., 591 F. Supp. 381, 387 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (applying Ohio law) 
(“What [the physician] might or might not have done involves to some degree his credibility. Thus, we conclude 
that it is for the jury to determine whether the presence of an adequate warning would have made no difference 
in [the physician’s] decision”); Strumph v. Schering Corp., 606 A.2d 1140, 1146-47 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1992) 
(“A well-prepared advocate may be able to erode at trial the physician’s testimony [that the physician would 
have prescribed the drug even in the face of a proper warning”); Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 976 F.2d 77, 83 n.9 
(1st Cir. 1992) (noting that even if physician’s testimony had been unequivocal on the issue of what physician 
would had done if given the appropriate warning, Massachusetts courts would be reluctant to permit such after-
the-fact speculation to insulate a pharmaceutical company from liability). 
 242. Doe, 927 F.2d at 195 n.32. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Sah & Fugh-Berman, supra note 25. 
 245. Supra note 23. 
37
Vukadin: Failure-to-Warn: Facing up to the Real Impact of Phamaceutical Ma
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2014
112 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:75 
dangerous for the particular patient. 
Courts’ analysis of warnings material in the context of a failure-to-warn case should, 
at a minimum, keep pace with research showing the true breadth and influence of warn-
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